A-Infos (en) France, OCL CA #358 - NEUKALEDONIEN - Bedeutet das neue Abkommen das Ende der Unabhängigkeit? Wohl kaum... (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

Am 12. Juli 2025 wurde das "Bougival-Abkommen" unterzeichnet, das von 
Macron und einem Großteil der Medien als "historisch" gefeiert wurde: 
Alle politischen Gruppierungen in Neukaledonien hatten sich angeblich 
auf die Gründung eines "kaledonischen Staates innerhalb Frankreichs" 
geeinigt. Doch am 9. August lehnte die Kanakische und Sozialistische 
Nationale Befreiungsfront (FLNKS) den Text ab, und da er zunehmend 
Kritik hervorrief, musste Macron neue Verhandlungen ansetzen, um ihn zu 
"präzisieren". Die FLNKS verweigerte die Teilnahme und lehnte auch das 
daraus hervorgegangene "Élysée-Oudinot-Abkommen" vom 19. Januar 2026 ab. 
Die Regierung will dieses Abkommen dennoch durch verschiedene Referenden 
in Verfassungsrecht umwandeln, doch die Sozialistische Partei (PS) hat 
nun angekündigt, es nicht zu unterstützen. Weitere Überraschungen sind 
möglich.

Since the May 2024 riots, the political class, business leaders, and 
unions in New Caledonia have been clamoring for financial aid from the 
French state to rectify the archipelago's economic situation. On 
December 5, 2025, Prime Minister Lecornu dangled before them the 
prospect of an "economic refounding pact" that would be funded by the 
disbursement of 2.2 billion euros over five years... but he made this 
windfall conditional on the adoption by New Caledonian elected officials 
of an austerity budget for 2026 and a commitment to implement structural 
reforms in public finances (1). Therefore, the government of New 
Caledonia decided almost unanimously on January 7, 2026, to reduce 
pensions and eliminate bridges in the civil service, yet another 
increase in electricity, etc., as well as to have all Caledonian public 
spending reviewed by commissions under the aegis of the State.

The inside story of the new agreement
On December 15, Lecornu announced he was abandoning the idea of a 
"citizen consultation" on the "Bougival Agreement," scheduled for March 
15, 2026. Since his government would not have had enough votes in 
Parliament to pass the law organizing this consultation (2), Macron 
preferred to invite the six political groups represented in the New 
Caledonian Congress to discuss "Bougival" again on January 16 in Paris.
On January 13, the UC-FLNKS and Nationalists group, led by the 
Caledonian Union (UC, a historical component of the FLNKS), declared it 
would not participate. The New Caledonian delegations that signed the 
"Elysée-Oudinot Agreement" on January 19 were therefore those of the 
Loyalists and the Rally-The Republicans (anti-independence), Caledonia 
Together and Oceanian Awakening (centrists), and UNI-Palika.
This latter group, led by Palika (the other historical component of the 
independence movement) and which, according to its own statements, 
"definitively" left the FLNKS in November 2025, has little to celebrate 
in having accepted the "Bougival" and "Elysée-Oudinot" agreements, as 
its voice was hardly heard during the negotiations. On the other hand, 
with the latest agreement, the anti-independence movement has 
undoubtedly obtained more than it hoped for: considerable sums to revive 
the Caledonian economy and institutions; and the reaffirmation that the 
Caledonian electorate would be expanded. The means for the wealthy 
Southern Province, with its anti-independence leadership, to dissociate 
itself from the "Kanak provinces" (North and Islands)...
On the eve of the negotiations, Nicolas Metzdorf, leader of the 
Loyalists and Caledonian MP, had threatened the French State with 
sedition if it did not produce "precise texts, accompanied by a clear 
timetable for review and adoption by Parliament": "We will radically 
change our strategy and turn against our own State using all the means 
at our disposal." He was heard: in the "Elysée-Oudinot agreement," there 
is no mention of "Kanaky" or "Kanaky - New Caledonia" - only "New 
Caledonia" is referred to. The signatories "commit themselves, along 
with the State, to promoting a process of reconciliation of memories, 
both those of the Kanak people and those of other communities, in order 
to heal the wounds of the past and those, more recent, stemming from the 
violence of May 2024." Not only is Kanak identity mentioned indirectly, 
by a simple reference to the Nouméa Accord (which discusses it at length 
in its preamble), but a "Caledonian identity" is also linked to Kanak 
identity (similarly, "Caledonian nationality" is accompanied by French 
nationality). The rest of the text follows suit (see the box 
"Elysée-Oudinot in brief").
At the end of 2025, New Caledonia nearly fell under state control 
because it had borrowed heavily from the state to finance part of its 
operations-which is generally prohibited-and it had a huge deficit. But 
an arrangement was reached: the New Caledonian government used the debt 
rescheduling mechanism (over ten years), with the state assuring it that 
it would not have to repay any loans in 2026 and 2027, and that its 
loans would gradually be converted into subsidies. This is what the 
"Elysée-Oudinot" agreement allows.

"ELYSEE-OUDINOT" IN BRIEF

The referendums on self-determination provided for in the Nouméa Accord 
having "deeply divided New Caledonia," the new agreement states, the 
focus will now be on "the permanent possibility of transferring the 
powers still held by the State within a framework organized with it, 
according to procedures guaranteeing a spirit of consensus, the 
requirement of reinforced majorities, and the approval of a majority of 
Caledonians." If the State were to one day transfer all sovereign powers 
to New Caledonia, the latter would not automatically attain "full 
sovereignty" (as stipulated in the Nouméa Accord): "The partners would 
meet to draw the consequences for the relationship between the State of 
New Caledonia and France."
The text provides no information on the question of the electorate. 
Therefore, the "Bougival" agreement still applies on this point - 
namely, extending voting rights to native-born citizens and voters with 
ten years of residency in New Caledonia (fifteen years for the 2026 
provincial elections).
The territory's "economic attractiveness" is the main focus of the new 
agreement, both for the French state and for New Caledonian business 
leaders, and this task largely falls to the provinces: an organic law 
will establish "the implementation of an effective mechanism for 
transferring powers from New Caledonia to the provinces, at their 
initiative," to provide them with "resources tailored to their 
responsibilities[such as water, the road network, or maritime 
transport], guaranteeing their financial autonomy"; similarly, they will 
be able to levy taxes.
Finally, the economic and social component that completes the agreement 
includes Lecornu's "refounding pact": creation of free trade zones, 
corporate tax exemptions for SMEs, public investments in sectors such as 
tourism, etc. Regarding the nickel sector (4,000 jobs), whose structural 
crisis has been exacerbated by the closure of sites since 2024, the 
government will grant new loans to the three main operators, and it will 
try to convince the European Union to buy the Caledonian ore - on the 
condition that this sector is transformed according to its instructions.

Down with the FLNKS!
On January 8, 2026, the UC-FLNKS and Nationalists group submitted a 
proposed resolution to the Caledonian Congress calling for the immediate 
development of a social emergency plan based on a broad partnership 
between the State, Caledonian institutions, local authorities, civil 
society, and economic stakeholders. In addition to measures aimed at 
strengthening food aid and access to healthcare, the plan proposed 
converting the "Covid and riot loans" granted by the State to New 
Caledonia into grants and rebuilding the territory's economy with 
international donors and the French Development Agency. This was enough 
to satisfy employers, unions, and political parties, yet the Congress 
adopted the resolution by only one vote - 20 in favor (UC-FLNKS, 
Caledonia Together, and Oceanian Awakening), 19 against (The Loyalists 
and The Rally), and 8 abstentions (UNI-Palika). Because the debates 
quickly veered towards an explosive topic: the political responsibility 
for the May 2024 riots, which anti-independence groups attribute to the 
UC (which has never explicitly acknowledged or condemned the "abuses") 
and to the CCAT, partly composed of members from its ranks (3).
In order to appease the FLNKS, the State first ensured that the CCAT 
members imprisoned in mainland France in the aftermath of the riots on 
serious charges were released with somewhat lighter charges. This is how 
the current president of the FLNKS, Christian Tein (a member of the CCAT 
and the UC), returned to the archipelago (4).

Demonstration in Nouméa, on November 24, 2023, for the arrival of Darmanin.
But the FLNKS persisted in its opposition to Macron's plans: on January 
21, it published a statement entitled "A pseudo-agreement imposed 
without the Kanak people cannot commit the future of our country or 
establish democracy." It reads: "Elysée-Oudinot" is endorsing "a power 
grab by the State (...) by blocking the so-called Bougival project," and 
is "contradictory to the Nouméa Accord and United Nations resolutions." 
"To claim to resolve a colonial conflict without the indigenous people 
concerned, without their customary authorities, without their national 
liberation movement (...) is a charade." The FLNKS also points to a 
"hyper-provincialization that is dangerous for all inhabitants, (...) 
particularly in the North and Islands provinces, because it will 
introduce a breach of equity between citizens (...) and reinforce the 
already excessive inequalities." "Depending on the province where one 
lives, one would no longer benefit from the same rights or the same 
services: schools, roads, social assistance, employment." He denounces 
"potential serious security risks" linked to the creation of provincial 
police forces. This new agreement is "clear economic blackmail," "an 
attempt at political buying," and-with the "unfreezing" of the electoral 
roll-"the end of any prospect of independence."
This stance by the FLNKS has unleashed hatred from the New Caledonian 
media, which are largely anti-independence (see the following article). 
La Dépêche de Nouméa, for example, described it as "a militant elite 
that claims to speak on behalf of a people without bothering to listen 
to them," and that "does not represent the entirety of the indigenous 
population" since other pro-independence movements exist, in particular 
UNI-Palika. As proof, according to this media outlet: in a poll 
commissioned in June 2025 from the Quid Novi institute, 52% of New 
Caledonians placed daily life (health, purchasing power, employment, 
security) at the top of their priorities, far ahead of the institutional 
future (29%); and, "among people of customary civil status, this trend 
is even more pronounced" (56% and 17%) because Kanaks constitute the 
majority of the poor on the archipelago (see the box "Kanak youth..."). 
Also according to this poll, "immediate independence[is]a minority 
position" among pro-independence supporters: "47% of voters who voted 
'yes' to independence in 2020 say they are opposed to immediate 
independence - 57% among people of customary civil status."
The same media outlets highlight the isolation of the FLNKS, supported 
only by LFI in France and by the UN internationally, while the 
"Elysée-Oudinot" agreement was signed by "approximately 75%" of elected 
officials in New Caledonia. They attribute Tjibaou's re-election as 
president of the UC (5), at its 56th congress in Maré (January 23-25), 
either to a harsher rhetoric he adopted "to get re-elected," or to a 
weakness of character - he allowed himself to be "radicalized by the 
extremist groups that call the shots" within the FLNKS.

Kanak youth
in the crosshairs of New Caledonian media

While sometimes feigning a certain "empathy" for young Kanaks, La 
Dépêche de Nouméa, La Voix du Caillou, and other anti-independence 
websites implicitly blame them for both the riots and acts of 
delinquency "linked to various addictions." They seize upon the 
slightest news item to highlight the rise of this delinquency "even" in 
the pro-independence provinces: "Insecurity no longer spares any 
territory (...). In Lifou, as elsewhere, republican order rests on 
vigilance, cooperation, and firmness, far removed from rhetoric of denial."
It is fortunate, then, that 2,600 gendarmes and police officers are 
still stationed in this archipelago of 264,000 inhabitants-a ratio of 10 
per 1,000, compared to 3.4 per 1,000 for mainland France, according to 
INSEE (the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies).

The game is not over yet.
The Lecornian "economic refounding pact" is already being implemented in 
the archipelago. A "housing and urban renewal mission," composed of 
"three national experts," was launched at the High Commission on January 
26th to rethink a social housing model that is "on its last legs," 
explains La Dépêche de Nouméa, "undermined by high vacancy rates, a 
surge in rent arrears, evictions, and dilapidated housing stock." The 
objective is "to restore public authority in areas where the State has 
withdrawn for too long" and where "trafficking and insecurity" prevail.

Those opposed to independence should not rejoice too soon, however, 
because the government's maneuvers to stifle the independence movement 
are already encountering obstacles.
Certainly, in order to obtain a fourth postponement of the provincial 
elections (which would allow the Caledonian electorate to "unfreeze" 
before the vote), Lecornu found a way to circumvent the Constitutional 
Council, which, on December 6, 2025, had set a deadline of "June 
28[2026]at the latest": he included this postponement in the draft 
constitutional law on "Elysée-Oudinot," so that the Council's opinion 
would no longer be required. Certainly also, across all political 
affiliations except the FLNKS, Caledonian elected officials sent a joint 
letter to all members of parliament to convince them to approve this 
draft constitutional law. But a delegation from the FLNKS (including 
Tjibaou, Tein, and Senator Robert Xowie) met with the Assembly's 
political groups to achieve the opposite result (6)... And the Socialist 
Party (PS) has, in any case, just made the implementation of the 
"Elysée-Oudinot" agreement unlikely by deciding to vote against it in 
both chambers (if the government persists in wanting to postpone the 
provincial elections until the end of December) or to abstain (if it 
leaves them in June). In an opinion piece published by Le Monde on 
February 17, PS leaders deemed this text "fraught with threats and 
dangers"-particularly for its lack of precision regarding the new 
Caledonian state and how it might acquire its sovereign powers; for the 
further postponement of the provincial elections it provides for (the PS 
had, however, voted for this postponement in November 2025...); and 
because it "is not possible to leave the UC-FLNKS out" of the 
discussions to reach a "consensual and inclusive agreement."
Thus, the Socialist Party (PS) has derailed the very tight electoral 
calendar that the government had established for New Caledonia: the 
Senate will indeed examine the draft constitutional reform concerning 
this territory starting February 24 (7), and the text will likely reach 
the National Assembly on March 30... but the Assembly will not adopt it 
(LFI, the RN, and the PS are opposed). Therefore, on April 13, 
Parliament will not convene in Congress to confirm the adoption of the 
constitutional reform, and the people of New Caledonia will not be 
consulted on it in June or July. Finally, the economic component of the 
organic law may be discussed between September and November, but the 
date and the electoral roll for the provincial elections remain unknown 
at this time...
Furthermore, while the pro-independence movement's representation in New 
Caledonian institutions has weakened over the past two years (it 
successively lost the presidency of the government and that of the 
Congress[8]), it cannot be asserted, as the anti-independence movement 
does, that a portion of its electorate will abandon it in the municipal 
and provincial elections, and it remains to be seen to what extent its 
internal divisions will harm it. Over its four decades of existence, the 
FLNKS has experienced numerous internal crises and splits, notably due 
to the competition between an increasingly reformist Palika and an 
increasingly "radical" UC. For years, it lacked leadership, and it was 
difficult to determine which parties it truly encompassed... and yet it 
retained its image as "representative of the Kanak people" (9).
The UC has announced its intention to present lists in every 
municipality of the archipelago for the municipal elections. Tjibaou, 
invoking the "community of destiny" championed by the Nouméa Accord, 
proposed alliances with Palika or with the two other components of UNI 
(10). For its part, Palika seems keen to run joint lists with the UC or 
other pro-independence groups, depending on local circumstances. It 
remains to be seen whether these various forces will be able to reach an 
agreement despite their disagreements over the last two accords.
The UC's refusal to sign them could also cost it votes among its 
traditional electorate; but two recent events show that even the 
UNI-Palika alliance did not achieve unanimous support within its own 
ranks by signing them. On January 28, Paul Néaoutyine - a prominent 
figure in the Palika party and the long-serving leader of the Northern 
Province - publicly criticized the "hyper-provincialization" sought by 
the "Bougival Agreement" and its consequences ("It's going to be 
partition"), adding: "I'm not about to swallow the talk of 
continuity[with the Nouméa Accord]when there isn't any." Meanwhile, 
activists calling for the "neutralization of the Bougival Agreement" and 
the unification of pro-independence groups left UNI-Palika to create the 
"association" Unity of the People in Kanaky (UPK), which, on February 7, 
brought together 70 people in Koné and which may join the FLNKS.

Vanina, February 23, 2026

Notes
1. The future of this "pact" also depended on the 2026 state budget. 
This was adopted on February 2nd after Lecornu invoked Article 49.3 for 
the third time. However, the Socialist Party (PS) appealed to the 
Constitutional Council, which is due to issue its opinion on the text on 
March 6th.
2. The New Caledonian Congress had also adopted the principle of this 
consultation with very little enthusiasm: 19 votes in favor (the 
anti-independence parties), 14 against (the FLNKS), and 19 abstentions 
(the pro-independence parties UNI-Palika, and the centrist parties 
Calédonie Ensemble and Eveil Océanien).
3. This coordination unit for field actions was created in November 2023 
by pro-independence activists from various parties to mobilize against 
the "unfreezing" of the electoral roll. See in particular the articles 
published in CA (no. 342 and following).
4. He remains under investigation for armed robbery as part of an 
organized gang, destruction of property as part of an organized gang, 
and conspiracy to commit crimes and offenses.
5. In the second round, he obtained 139 votes out of 200. Christian Tein 
also remained the UC's general commissioner.
6. At the same time, rallies were held, including in front of the High 
Commission in Nouméa, to support his initiative.
7. He is also expected to examine a draft constitutional law on Corsican 
autonomy in March or April.
8. He retains one member of parliament, Tjibaou.
9. This is also why, while careful not to upset Palika and deploring the 
"empty chair policy" adopted by the FLNKS, the Socialist Party is 
aligning itself with the latter's position.
10. The Progressive Union in Melanesia (UPM) and the National Union for 
Independence in Diversity (UNID).

http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4655
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