A-Infos (en) Utopian no. #3 - Spore: Public Policy is Class Policy, the Case of the Postal Anthrax Attacks, by William E. Bachman

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It is a common vision in the U.S. that the government is a
neutral entity, standing outside and above the myriad con-
tending forces in society. However, it is not disconnected
from those forces. As a result, its policies are seen as a sort
of vector sum of the strength those forces exert upon on
the state. Coupled with a set of democratic rights such as
free elections and free expression, such a political order
has been called a polyarchy by the noted political scientist
Robert Dahl.1 Such a society has been celebrated as plural-
istic by any number of political scientists, politicians and
commentators.
My view is that although such pluralism exists in the U.S.
and other Westernized democracies, such governments are
in fact instruments of class rule. Further, the authority of
these formally democratic governments is based not on
universal democracy, but on democracy within the class
which rules. Moreover, the government's actual rule is
based on coercion: that is, the power of the military and
police.
Anthrax spores. (www.hybridmedicalanimation.com)

It is frequently said that democratic government is a 
government of laws. What do the laws do? In sheer 
volume, the vast majority of laws are for the protection and
regulation of property. Entire bodies of law are devoted to
such specialties: corporate law, real estate law, tax law, bank-
ruptcy law, etc. I would argue that the public policy of a
government of laws is in fact the policy of the propertied
class. This paper will discuss one example of this, the
response of the government, its Centers for Disease Control
and postal management to the anthrax attacks in the fall of
2001. While one incident can't prove how the whole system
works, it offers a particularly glaring illustration of how the
system's representatives disregarded the propertyless and
served the propertied in a specific case. We will see that the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) covered up the serious-
ness of the anthrax threat; postal management did the same;
and the major unions involved, the American Postal
Workers Union (APWU) and the National Postal Mail
Handlers Union, did little effective to oppose them. As a
partial exception, the APWU leadership at the Morgan
postal facility in New York, where I work, filed a lawsuit to
close the facility for testing and decontamination, but didn't
fight aggressively to organize workers there to fight for their
own health and safety.
Before going on, let me clarify my notion of class. The prop-
ertied, or capitalist class, can only be looked at in relation to
another class of people who don't have property or capital
(or much of it). These are general conceptions: in particular,
they don't mean that an individual with little or no capital is
automatically a member of the propertyless, or working,
class. U.S. society has many, many people (the middle class)
who have little property but still exercise power over others
who also have little; for example, police officers, supervisors
and some judges.2 U.S. society also has tens of thousands of
people who have little power or property but work for and
identify with those who do. These people are also "middle
class" and are frequently found in the professions. The staff
people at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) played that
role during the anthrax crisis. This paper will deal with
members of a ruling class, or the authorities, as those who
have property and/or power; and members of a working
class as those who don't have either.

The anthrax attacks by mail came in two waves. The first
apparently was a series of letters to the media: NBC, CBS,
ABC, the New York Post, and the American Media company
of Boca Raton, Fla., which publishes the National Enquirer,
among other papers. These letters were all mailed on 18
September from the Trenton, N.J., area. The second wave,
also sent from Trenton, was mailed 9 October to Sens.
Tom Daschle of South Dakota and Patrick Leahy of New
Hampshire. To this date it is unknown who sent the let-
ters.3 These mailings resulted in the deaths of one recipi-
ent, Robert Stevens of American Media, as well as two
postal workers, Thomas Morris, Jr. and Joseph Curseen, Jr.
In addition, two persons with no known connection to the
mailings, Kathy Nguyen of the Bronx and Ottilie Lundgren
of Connecticut, died, perhaps from receiving accidentally
contaminated mail.
The response by the authorities to the first wave of attacks
was characterized by ignorance and misdiagnosis at best
and willful misinformation at worst. The former is not
surprising since there have been only 236 cases of all types
of anthrax in the U.S. between 1955 and 1999, and less
Ottilie Lundgren, killed by anthrax. (REUTERS)

than a score of the inhalation form in the last century.4
Not until Robert Stevens died of inhalation anthrax on 5
October 2001 in Florida did doctors elsewhere begin cor-
rectly recognizing symptoms of others who already were
sick. But Stevens' widely reported death also moved the
high-level authorities to try "managing" the situation by
issuing soothing misinformation. Health and Human
Services Secretary Tommy Thompson portrayed Stevens'
illness on TV as an isolated case, probably due to natural
causes although Stevens fit none of the risk categories for
contracting anthrax in that way. Thompson even went on
to suggest that Stevens got the disease by drinking contam-
inated water although no known case of such transmission
exists in the medical literature.5

The entire House of Representatives, some Senate Office Buildings,
the Supreme Court and part of the State Department were closed
even if no anthrax was found on the premises. At the same time post
offices --especially the Morgan processing center in New York --
were kept open although anthrax was found in the buildings.

That public policy is class policy only became apparent with
the second wave of attacks. The letter to Sen. Daschle was
opened 15 October. Within days major government
offices--the entire House of Representatives, some Senate
Office Buildings, the Supreme Court and part of the State
Department--were closed even if no anthrax was found on
the premises. The offices were shut as a precaution against
the possibility that someone might get sick. At the same time
post offices--especially the Morgan processing center in
New York--were kept open although anthrax was found in
the buildings. In other words, the authorities were taking no
chances that their "important people" and their staffs might
get sick, but were willing to gamble on the health of postal
workers. It should be noted that postal workers not only are
part of the class which lacks power and property, but also
have a much higher proportion of Black people and women
in their ranks than those who have offices in the govern-


Postal Service trucks in funeral procession for postal worker
Joseph Curseen, Jr., Oct. 27, 2001. (AP)

ment buildings which were closed. So the disregard of their
safety reeks of racial discrimination as well.
Postal management played a central role in the gamble.
But the managers were assisted by the CDC: both conve-
niently pointed fingers at each other in order to continue
playing "keep-it-open." The managers also were helped
greatly by the courts and by the federal law banning its
employees from going on strike (as if this latter instru-
ment isn't a stellar example by itself of class-based public
policy). Finally, the managers were helped, either actively
or by default, by some of the postal union leaders.
Postal management's primary goal is to move the mail. It's
obvious in its famous slogan, "Neither rain, nor snow, nor
gloom of night...," and the volume it moves in these some-
times adverse conditions is enormous. The post office
delivers 608 million pieces of mail every day.6 The vast
majority of this is commercial. Despite fax, e-mail and the
internet, tens of thousands of businesses still depend on
the regular mail for their bills, legal papers and other
hard-copy correspondence. Stopping this flow for any rea-
son would cause huge backups and serious damage to
business profits.
By the time of the second wave, postal management and the
CDC were quite aware that anthrax could spread through
the mails. On 15 October, the same day that the letter to
Sen. Daschle was opened, the post office sent out two news
alerts: one reporting that postal workers at the Boca Raton
office had tested negative; and another stating that postal
workers may use gloves and masks to protect themselves if
they wish. But that's as far as management was willing to go.
"...keep the mail moving. `The whole country is depending
on us to do that,'" one alert quoted Postmaster General Jack
Potter. "Panic must not defeat us." 7
While Potter tried to rally postal workers with patriotism
and peptalks, the House of Representatives two days later
shut down completely--although no anthrax had been
found there. On the Senate side, where the spores had been
discovered, twelve offices were closed and the staff was
immediately tested and given the antibiotic ciprofloxacin
(Cipro).8 Later, the Supreme Court and parts of the State
Department closed because of contamination found in
their mailrooms miles away.9
The day after the letter to Daschle was opened (Oct. 16),
the authorities knew it had passed through the Brentwood
processing center in D.C. While the workers there loudly
complained about the lack of testing, postal officials
refused to close the plant and only began testing the
equipment on 18 October. They and the CDC did not
begin testing people until 21 October, after one worker
had died.10 On 19 October Postmaster General Potter
held a news conference to reassure everyone that things
were under control. Management distributed a pamphlet
to the workers entitled, "When Terror Strikes--Tips for
Handling the Crisis." Among other things, the booklet rec-
ommended that people "Spend time doing things other
than watching or listening to news of the disaster."11
These were protected: Senators Trent Lott (left) and Tom Daschle. (CNN)
The two workers in Washington died of inhalation
anthrax on 21-22 October: Thomas Morris, Jr., 55, a clerk
with 28 years' service in the post office; and Joseph
Curseen, Jr., 47, a mail processor who had worked in the
post office for 15 years. Both worked at Brentwood. After
being sick for several days, they had finally gone to seek
treatment too late for their mysterious ailments. Near
death, Morris made the now-famous 911 call commenting
on the information put out by postal management. "I
have a tendency not to believe these people...," he told the
operator. Two others were seriously ill. Reflecting on the
disparity in the treatment of postal workers and those
who worked on Capitol Hill, Tony Jackson, a 22-year vet-
eran postal worker in D.C., observed, "This makes you
realize that, just like everything else, some people get
more consideration than others."12
A partial exception to the overall collusion of government,
postal management, and union leaders occurred at the
Morgan facility in New York. Morgan is the largest post
office in the city and one of the biggest in the country.
With 5,000 workers, it processes nearly all the mail for
Manhattan. At the beginning of November the New York
Metro leadership of the APWU filed a lawsuit to close the
facility for testing and cleaning, and the union held other
actions in support of that demand. The rest of this article
will focus on events in this postal facility.

And these were not: postal worker Thomas Morris, Jr., dead 
from anthrax (left); 
mourners carrying coffin of Joseph Curseen. (CBS, AP)

At Morgan, the response of postal management and the
CDC was similar to that in Washington. The building must
stay open; the mail must keep moving. The workers can
protect themselves by wearing gloves and masks, and by
being vigilant and taking care of themselves.13 Later, man-
agement and the CDC made available antibiotics as a
"purely precautionary" measure. In effect, the authorities
went to Atlantic City, counted some cards, and bet that no
one would get sick.
Fortunately the story at Morgan is not as sad as the one 
in D.C. No one at the post office in New York did get sick.
But management put out the same lies, omissions and 
evasions. On 15 October workers received the newsbreak
telling them not to panic and to keep the mail moving
while simultaneously announcing that gloves and masks
were now available allegedly to protect them. A later 
bulletin touted the new N100 type of mask as being highly
effective in filtering out particles as small as anthrax
spores. It went to say that the N100 was "certified by
NIOSH," the National Institute of Occupational Safety 
and Health, a division of the CDC. However, what it did
not say was that no mask was certified by anyone as safe
against anthrax. On 16 October Dennis O'Neil, a mail
processor, filed a Form 1767, "Report of Hazardous
Condition," warning of possible anthrax contamination
and recommending the immediate suspension of practices
such as using compressed air to clean machines. Contrary
to management's own rules, he received no response.14

Management was not communicating the real threat. So 
it was a surprise to the skeleton crew working on Sunday,
21 October, when people in moon suits suddenly appeared
and began doing mysterious things around some of the
equipment. Three days after these testers departed, and
two days after the deaths were reported in D.C., manage-
ment told the workers about the testing and announced
the "purely precautionary" distribution of antibiotics.
But as before the authorities played down the real danger
to the workers:
This testing and availability of antibiotics
is "purely precautionary," said Steven Ostroff,
epidemiologist for CDC, at a meeting today...
Ostroff stressed that based on all available
evidence, the risks here in New York City are
minimal. He cited the lack of a single anthrax
diagnosis in New York in the past three weeks,
and the fact that both the NBC and NY Post
Newspaper [sic] cases have responded success-
fully to treatment. Also, no letter mailed since
Sept. 18 has tested positive for anthrax. "There
is no risk from what happened a month ago,"
Ostroff said.15

That night management quarantined five Delivery Bar
Code Sorters (DBCS) due to anthrax contamination.16
However, the managers still refused to close the building.
What "quarantining" a DBCS meant to management was
shutting off the power to that machine and surrounding it
with yellow crime-scene tape. All other DBCS's in the area
continued to run. In some cases people continued working
as close as six feet from contaminated machines which
were just on the other side of the yellow tape.
Although the yellow tape was a visible barrier for people,
the workers on the floor (and many first-line supervisors)
realized that anthrax spores recognized no such borders.
As a result, fear and tension grew. One electronic techni-
cian threw away all his tools and workclothes. Absenteeism
mounted.
Senior management tried to contain its problem first by
trying to whip the first-line supervisors into formation.
The latter were told that they were the "point men" who
had to lead the workers in moving the mail. This had little
effect, however, since most workers didn't believe the
supervisors and many of the supervisors didn't believe the
people over them. One supervisor related to me that the
point man on a patrol was the person who got shot first.
Another supervisor was reprimanded for distributing
accurate information on anthrax from the Arnot-Ogden
Medical Center.
Postal management was not the only player. In almost
every statement defending its policies, it stated it was 
acting at the behest of the CDC. A few days prior to the
evidentiary hearing in the local APWU's lawsuit to close
Morgan, I asked Robert Daruk, the plant manager, if there
were plans to test any more machines beyond the limited
number which had been done. He responded, "No,
because the CDC said it wasn't necessary." The people at
the CDC, meanwhile, maintained that they had no power
and could only make recommendations. It is unknown to
me what the CDC recommended to the House of
Representatives, the Supreme Court, the State Dept., and
the other agencies in Washington which closed buildings
in which no anthrax had been found. But clearly these
institutions took it upon themselves to shut down for
testing and decontamination as a precaution. Not so 
with the post office: management used every excuse to
stay open.17
Later, after Morgan had been partially cleaned, I asked 
Dr. Stephanie Factor of the CDC about the possibility of
someone falling ill years from now from residual spores
still in the building. She responded that it was highly
unlikely and that the chances of getting sick depended on
the dosage. I pointed out that no one knew what the per-
missable exposure limit was to anthrax spores (which is
also why no mask is certified against the bacterium). I
went on to say that Kathy Nguyen and Ottilie Lundgren
had apparently died from very low dosages contracted
from cross-contaminated mail. Her serious response to
this was that she believed that these two women had not
become infected from the mail at all, and that a serial
killer was "out there" preying on allegedly isolated and
lonely women with doses of anthrax spores. I walked away
from our conversation feeling that the mental patients had
taken over the hospital.
Postal workers' anxiety took two forms. First was the
obvious fear of a lethal spore which neither could be 
seen, smelled nor tasted. Second was the fear of the conse-
quences of doing what was necessary in the situation:
walk out. It is illegal for federal workers to strike. Many of
the older people at Morgan remember the thousands of
workers fired in the postal wildcats of 1978 and the
Professional Air Traffic Controllers strike three years later.
The consciousness of these events seeps down even to
those workers who weren't even born when the struggles
occurred As a result there was almost no sentiment at
Morgan to strike.
Nor did the actions of the union leaderships open a way 
to safety. These actions took diverse forms, but all worked
to keep people on the job. I am not arguing here that the
union leadership should have called a walkout. Instead 
I am asserting that there was not even an attempt to
organize workers to do what what was necessary to guar-
antee an adequate decontamination of the building.

Eventually, on 6 November, New York Metro APWU
appeared in court to close Morgan. I was a witness for the
union in that action. But this effort was weakened from the
beginning. First, not all the union leaders favored closing
Morgan. The workers in the building are represented by two
unions, the APWU and Local 300 of the National Postal
Mail Handlers Union, a division of the Laborers
International Union of North America (LIUNA). While the
New York APWU leadership was vociferously demanding
the closure of Morgan, the Mail Handlers were not. Larry
Adams, the regional president of Local 300, was out of town
during the most critical week of the crisis. The New York
Branch president of Local 300, Florencio Hooker, issued a
leaflet which used a quarter of its space explaining anthrax
and the other three-quarters apologizing for management
and attacking "elements" which have "preyed on your fear
and anxiety" to close Morgan and "get you fired." 18
Second, the national APWU leadership stayed on the side-
lines in the New York struggle. This is being charitable. Faced
with a problem which threatened the lives of everyone who
worked in Morgan, the National negotiated an individualized
response. It agreed at the height of the crisis on 26 October
to let any worker sign out on his or her own vacation time or
request a transfer to another, presumably clean, facility. Later,

Coffin of Kathy Nguyen, victim of anthrax. 
(Hospital Workers Local 1199,
Service Employees International Union)

William Burrus, the national president, called Morgan work-
ers "heroic" for continuing to work at the Big Spore.19 
Even with this individualized agreement, absenteeism was
massive. Hundreds of Morgan workers stayed home. On 29
October only ten of nineteen mail handlers in the cancel-
lation section reported for work. Many workers continued
to stay out for weeks, but gradually dribbled back as they
exhausted their leave time and heard no reports of anyone
getting sick.
William Smith, president of the New York local APWU,
has denounced postal management on numerous occa-
sions. He has called them "evil" and "jerks" among other
epithets. For this he was ejected from Morgan on 11
September and barred from the Bulk and Foreign Mail
facility in New Jersey. However, for all his correct denunci-
ations, he has a tendency to go to court to seek relief
rather than organize the membership. This happened 
during the anthrax crisis.
There is nothing wrong with going to court. Dennis
O'Neil, the lead plaintiff, asserted that faced with an emer-
gency, he couldn't wait for management to respond to his
Hazardous Condition complaint, nor could he go through
the time-consuming grievance procedure. So he filed 
a lawsuit. However, for workers to rely on the court is a 
hazardous condition of another sort. The courts are part
of the government of the propertied class; their primary
purpose is to apply the laws which protect and regulate
property. Seldom are the courts friendly to workers.
New York Metro went to court. It did not mobilize its
membership. I shall cite two examples. The first occurred
early in the morning of 26 October, probably the most
tense day of the crisis. Management was still refusing to
close the DBCS section, let alone the building. It was still
harassing workers who wanted to leave. In this situation a
proposal was made for the union to distributee a flyer
informing the workers that under Article 14 of the
National Agreement, they had a right to refuse to work in
a hazardous area. William Smith rejected the proposal.20
Second, a demonstration at Morgan clearly was in order at
the peak of the problem. Such an action would have shown

Mail sorting room. Note how closely machines are spaced. (Singapore Post)

management and the world how determined the workers
were to labor in a safe environment; and it would have
demonstrated to the workers themselves that they were 
not isolated individuals in confronting the crisis. But no
demonstration was called until six weeks later and that
event was held not at Morgan, but two blocks away in
front of the General Post Office.
The union's executive vice-president, Jonathan Smith, also
can give a good speech. He made a particularly effective
one outside Morgan on the afternoon of 26 October. I
don't know what his strategy is, but a brief exchange with
management inside Morgan that same day has made me
pause. Smith, another union official, and I came upon
Frank Calabrese, who is the day shift manager, near the
area containing the contaminated DBCS's.

"You think I don't care about the people who work here?"
Calabrese asked us, defending management's actions.
"No, no," the two union officers responded, indicating that
they believed he did.
Calabrese then continued to defend management's pro-
gram. At that point I was thinking, "These guys just gave
away the store without an argument." However, I decided
to be as diplomatic as possible.
"Let's say that you really do care about the people here," I
said. "But it's also clear that the senior management wants
to keep the place open. At best, what you have is conflict-
ing goals, and that is a big problem."

There was no response.
The union lawsuit, formally known as Smith v. Potter,
was filed under the federal Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), which covers toxic wastes. The
union's memorandum argued that anthrax spores consti-
tuted a toxic waste. The action asked for a preliminary
injunction to close Morgan for adequate testing and
decontamination. At the time the suit was filed, only 
limited testing had been done on the DBCS's; no testing
had been done on the Optical Character Readers or on
one Advanced Facer-Canceller which also could have
processsed the contaminated letters which were sent to
New York.
At the evidentiary hearing on 6 November, the union 
presented expert witnesses who detailed the anthrax
threat. I shall mention a few highlights. First, it was
revealed that postal management was handling a toxic
materials problem in a backward fashion by handing out
personal protection equipment, that is, the gloves and
masks. According to Edward Olmsted, a Certified
Industrial Hygienist with twenty years' experience,
standard procedure instead is to: (1) stop the problem at
the source; (2) if that is impossible, to isolate it from the
workers; (3) only then to issue personal protection equip-
ment. Second, although the judge, John Keenan, seemed 
to be unmoved by the union's testimony on the direct
threat of anthrax spores to the humans working at
Morgan, he was clearly troubled by reports that Morgan
was infested with mice. Third, when asked if he had the
anthrax test results, Plant Manager Daruk said no, he 
didn't have them, and deferred to Northeast Regional
Vice-President David Solomon. Solomon said he didn't
have them, either, and passed the buck on to the regional
safety director, who said that he also didn't have them and
had merely heard about the contaminated machines in a
telephone call from Washington. At this point the judge
ordered the managers to produce the results the next day,
but in a foreshadowing of the end of this story, he failed
to sanction them when they didn't.
As before, management relied on the CDC's Dr. Ostroff.
Ostroff again minimized the danger and relied on a study
done of an accidental release of anthrax spores into the
atmosphere from a germ warfare laboratory in the Soviet
Union many years ago. That study showed that the greatest
danger to humans occurred immediately after the release. He
didn't comment directly on the applicability of that study to
a release of spores inside an enclosed building such as
Morgan. Ostroff added that the distribution of the antibiotic
ciprofloxacin was merely to "assure the workers." 21
The judge's decision was not surprising. He denied the
application for a preliminary injunction for closure.
"...[T]he balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the
defendant," he wrote in his opinion. That is, Judge Keenan
constructed a balance. On one side was the chance of
someone getting sick or dying; on the other were the costs
of closing Morgan. Those costs were more of a hardship
than the possibility of human beings contracting a fatal 
illness. Property and capital rule.
Although the request for a preliminary injunction was
denied, at this writing the suit itself is still pending. Also,
in one small concession to the union, the judge ordered a
massive extermination of the mice.

Notes
1. See Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, pp. 218-221.
2. The constitution of the New York Metro local of the American
Postal Workers Union (APWU) makes this latter distinction in
defining the eligibility of candidates to run for union office: "...any
postal employee who voluntarily holds a managerial, supervisory,
or EAS position with responsibility for issuing or recommending
discipline, or applying or interpreting the National Agreement...
shall be ineligible to hold office..."
3. It should be noted that while "unknown" is the official line,
Barbara Hatch Rosenberg of the Federation of American
Scientists' Chemical and Biological Weapons Program asserted at a
talk at Princeton in February that the government has had a sus-
pect in the case since the previous October. "We know that the FBI
is looking at this person, and it's likely that he participated in the
past in secret activities that the government would not like to see
disclosed," she said. "And this raises the question of whether the
FBI may be dragging its feet somewhat and may not be so anxious
to bring to public light the person who did this." Quoted by
Joseph Dee, New Jersey Online, 19 February 2002.
4. "C.D.C. Team Tackles Anthrax," New York Times 16 October 2001:
F7; "Experts Revisit Views on Surviving Anthrax," New York Times 23
October 2001: B8.
5. "Anthrax Missteps Offer Guide to Fight Next Bioterror Battle," New
York Times 6 January 2002:16.
6. uspsnewsbreak p.m., 15 October 2001, 2pm.
7. Ibid.; uspsnewsbreak p.m., 15 October 2001, 5pm.
8. "Tracking Bioterror's Tangled Course," New York Times 26
December 2001: B4.
9. The message from the authorities clearly was that the post offices
couldn't be shut down because they are vital to the functioning of
society. Conversely, does this mean the House, Senate, Supreme Court,
and State Department are not vital to society?
10. "Officials' Response to Anthrax Riles Workers" by Dan Davidson,
Federal Times.com 29 October 2001.
11. "A Quick Response for Politicians; A Slower One for Mail
Workers," New York Times 23 October 2001: B7.
12. Ibid.
13 uspsnewsbreak p.m., 15 October 2001, 2pm
14. I filed another 1767 sometime later about another possible anthrax
danger; to this day I have also gotten no response.
15. uspsnews, 24 October 2001. It should be noted that the letters to
Sens. Daschle and Leahy were mailed on 9 October.
16. A Delivery Bar Code Sorter sorts a letter by reading and interpret-
ing the black bar code on the front of the piece. It then transports it at
high speed by belts, pulley and diverter gates to one of many bins on
the machine. A DBCS can be up to 85 feet long.
17. It should be noted that on 24 October the citywide mainte-
nance office put out a memorandum stating, among other things,
that high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) vacuum cleaners were
not required to clean equipment. HEPA machines cost much more
than ordinary vacuum cleaners which have porous filters useless
against small particles. This order was changed only after the CDC
recommended using HEPA machines in its Health Advisory of 31
October. It should be further noted that the same bulletin also
recommended installing HEPA filters on the heating, ventilation
and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems. To my knowledge this has
never been done.
18. "Anthrax Update," National Postal Mail Handlers Union Local 300
News Alert, 29 October 2001.
19. "Everyday Heroics," American Postal Worker Nov./Dec. 2001: 12.
20. The union later included this information in a Flash with five
other, common-sense points like, "Obtain the Cipro drug from postal
management immediately if you test positive for anthrax." The Flash
was headlined: "NEW YORK METRO MEMBERS: TAKE OWN PRE-
CAUTION AGAINST ANTHRAX SCARE." In other words, workers,
you're on your own.
21. "City Postal Risk `Very Low,'" by Patricia Hurtado, Newsday 7
November 2001: A18.

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