A-Infos (en) Anarkismo.net, The Wallpaper War: the United States a decade after 9/11 by Michael Schmidt

As the US enters yet another election cycle (though it is hard to say whether the US is 
ever not in election mode these days), it is worth interrogating the current state of the 
world’s unipolar hyperpower – and of the foreign policy, red in tooth and claw, that 
affects us all. ---- The first thing that is important to recognise about the foreign 
policy of the United States of America is that it has a very specific history, or rather a 
national mythology that distinguishes it from other countries by the explicit nature of 
its revolutionary aims. The Revolutionary War established a unique republican state in the 
West, a reflection in part of the values of the French Revolution, but, isolated by the 
vast Atlantic, destined to pursue a path of its own.

It is thus useful to consider the US state as an explicitly revolutionary state (albeit 
institutionalised in the Mexican sense of the word), with a national mythology which 
endows it with a sense of mission in the world. Comparable, though very different, states 
with expansionist missions driven by revolutionary myths would include Revolutionary 
France, the Soviet Union until its collapse, Nazi Germany, and post-apartheid South Africa 
today, with a ruling party explicitly dedicated to a “National Democratic Revolution”. The 
foreign policy and thus warmaking of Britain and the Netherlands, in contrast, despite 
having possessed globe-spanning pre-war empires, were never guided by anything similar to 
such political myths.


Introduction: A Dispatch from the Hyperpower

As the US enters yet another election cycle (though it is hard to say whether the US is 
ever not in election mode these days), it is worth interrogating the current state of the 
world’s unipolar hyperpower – and of the foreign policy, red in tooth and claw, that 
affects us all.

I arrived in the USA on the eve of the 10th Anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
spent just over a month there, and left just after visiting the Occupy Wall Street sit-in 
on Columbus Day. Book-ended by these two great, emotive American commemorations, my visit 
to the US was the first I had made there in 27 years and I was very curious to see how 
things had changed since the Wild West heyday of Reaganomics.

Visiting as a teenager, albeit one from the side aligned with the West against the Soviet 
Bloc, I had been overwhelmed by the brash displays of American consumerism. I was, after 
all, visiting from the grey, razorwire-snarled frontlines, from a place not dissimilar, 
strangely enough, to East Germany (with their granite faces, black Hombergs and black 
suits with red lapel carnations, there was little visible or visceral difference between 
Erich Honecker and PW Botha). Accustomed to austerity, I was offended by Western waste, 
and by the hollow ostentation of what we would now call the “bling”.

But the Wall had long fallen and the world and I had changed unalterably. Born into war – 
the 1961 formation of the ANC’s armed wing having preceded my birth by five years – and 
having expected peace with the end of that misnamed “Cold War” in which South African 
conscripts like myself had fought a hot war, partly a US proxy war, against Cuban, East 
German and Soviet-supplied armor in Angola, I had hoped the fall of apartheid and of the 
bipolar superpower world of which it was a relic to bring peace.

But the world of 2011 was a world of permanent warfare – and the USA was the prime 
progenitor, in thrall to the ascendancy of what had once been accurately identified by 
warmongering US President Lyndon B Johnson as “the military-industrial complex,” a useful 
shorthand for the agglomeration of corporations based on the oil and defence industries 
which often drive US foreign policy in a protectionist and sabre-rattling fashion.

As the days passed into weeks, I was impressed by the repeated references in the domestic 
media to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and to ongoing terrorism trials – references 
which, apart from a lone notice of the combat death in Helmand of a 22-year-old Marine 
from Asheville, in the mountains of North Carolina, seemed remote from the apparent calm 
of everyday American life, a wallpaper war that served as a frequently-referenced, but 
never quite real backdrop to daily dramas.

That calm proved deceptive, as demonstrated in particular by the internal wars being 
fought over cultural issues such as the profiling of Muslim Americans as automatic 
terrorist threats, President Barack Obama’s reversal of the don’t-ask-don’t-tell policy on 
gays in the military, and Alabama’s harsh new law on undocumented immigrants. This article 
will interrogate that dynamic tension, between a country perpetually at war abroad – and a 
voting populace at home who enable that warmaking in a context in which they are largely 
untouched by its effects.
The Ghosts of Wars Past

The first thing that is important to recognise about the foreign policy of the United 
States of America is that it has a very specific history, or rather a national mythology 
that distinguishes it from other countries by the explicit nature of its revolutionary 
aims. The Revolutionary War established a unique republican state in the West, a 
reflection in part of the values of the French Revolution, but, isolated by the vast 
Atlantic, destined to pursue a path of its own. It is thus useful to consider the US state 
as an explicitly revolutionary state (albeit institutionalised in the Mexican sense of the 
word), with a national mythology which endows it with a sense of mission in the world. 
Comparable, though very different, states with expansionist missions driven by 
revolutionary myths would include Revolutionary France, the Soviet Union until its 
collapse, Nazi Germany, and post-apartheid South Africa today, with a ruling party 
explicitly dedicated to a “National Democratic Revolution”. The foreign policy and thus 
warmaking of Britain and the Netherlands, in contrast, despite having possessed 
globe-spanning pre-war empires, were never guided by anything similar to such political myths.

And because the US national institutional-revolutionary myth is rooted in an armed defence 
of its version of democratic values, its missionary zeal comes armed; in colonial times 
this would have meant Bible and black-powder; but now it involves Hollywood/Madison Avenue 
and US Air Force/CIA-operated Reaper hunter-killer drones. Despite its 
institutional-revolutionary sense of mission, my term describes the USA at the federal, 
collective level, and it is important to recognise that there remain significant, deep, 
historically-rooted regional differences between blocs of individual States – and not 
merely between the Old North and Old South, or between the East Coast and West Coast (1).

Wherever one goes in the US, one finds evocations of the ghosts of wars past. There are 
innumerable Revolutionary War statues of alert musket-toting Minutemen, and unashamed 
tributes in the Southern States to the Confederate Army (the chapel at Duke University in 
North Carolina has statues of Confederate generals guarding its portico (2)). Less in 
evidence, unless one looks at the US Marine Corps Museum in Washington DC, are 
remembrances of American armed interventions in half of the developing world, though a 
current USMC recruiting pamphlet that I found on the Duke campus boasts: “More than two 
centuries of winning battles”.

But ubiquitous in the form of public memorials, is World War II which for the Baby-Boomer 
generation of US presidents prior to Obama was the revolutionary myth updated for the 
modern era: the shining democratic torch putting evil Nazism to flame and banishing it 
from the world stage.

The National World War II Museum in New Orleans is an intriguing installation whose 
curators are clearly trying to grapple honestly with an uncomfortable set of facts. In 
attempting to redress the imbalances of the past, displays examine the anti-Japanese 
racism of the US military alongside Japanese anti-Americanism, and sombrely examine the 
fire-bombing of Tokyo and the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki – but stop short of 
describing these latter as the actual crimes against humanity they were, for it is, I 
assume, considered morally impossible for an institutional-revolutionary democracy to 
admit to having committed genocide.

Vietnam is of course the other war that is indelibly imprinted on the modern American 
conscience, though for very different reasons: there, the enemy was evil Communism, but 
the torch of democracy sputtered and died in Saigon, a failure that continues to define 
the Left and haunt the Right. A 10 October New York Times op-ed piece called Vietnam a 
ghost that dogged Obama’s war policy; meanwhile the “Wall of Healing” Vietnam Memorial – a 
mobile miniature of the long black marble wall inscribed with names of the dead at The 
Mall in Washington – travelled the country, affording far-flung veterans the opportunity 
to mourn their lost youth.
The Globalisation of War Today

Any commentator on American affairs worth their salt has noted the echoes in the American 
psyche of the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in the 2001 “9/11” attacks in New York 
City and Washington: both were rare, massive attacks on US soil that shook a complacent, 
inward-looking populace to its core and forced them to re-examine the world outside. 
Conspiracy theorists claim that Pearl Harbour’s “day that will live in infamy” had in fact 
not proven so long-lived, had faded in the public mind, and that a cynical cabal within 
the military-industrial complex orchestrated 9/11 as a pro-war motivational spectacular. 
I’m not going to pronounce on that – aside from noting that the abysmal pseudo-documentary 
Zeitgeist, so beloved of the Left, in fact clearly originates with the paranoid American 
Right. What is true, however, is that the direct effect of 9/11 was to breathe new life 
into the American institutional-revolutionary mission abroad.

Recognisable chunks of the aircraft engines and landing gear debris from 9/11 are 
displayed in shafts of light as holy relics at the Newseum in Washington, the centerpiece 
of a sort of stations-of-the-cross hagiography of the FBI’s role in American internal 
affairs. That very day, the nation’s front-page news in just about every newspaper 
celebrated the killing by Reaper drone of alleged Al-Qaeda leader in Yemen, Abu Ali 
Al-Harithi. The socio-political aftermath of 9/11 was ever-present.

I walked to the 9/11 Ground Zero memorial building site in New York City – which is still 
partly a big construction site, a decade after the event – and took photographs in a local 
diner of a score of firemen who had lost their lives that day, a reminder of the intimate, 
emotional drivers behind the Iraqi and Afghan Wars; the widening ripples of the seemingly 
perpetual “War on Terror”:
Pakistan: I visited the US Navy Memorial in Washington which lauds the SEALs whose Team 6 
killed Osama bin Laden last year. Interestingly enough, former Obama Press Secretary 
Robert Gibbs had admitted at a talk that I attended at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill that the SEALs had gone into Pakistan with orders to kill not capture and 
bring to trial Osama bin Laden, in line with the Nuremburg principles which the US had 
such a leading role in establishing. This embrace of extrajudicial action is more than 
adequately demonstrated by the “extraordinary renditions” (kidnapping) of terror suspects 
to Guantanamo and other detention facilities – and their treatment once there, something 
that Obama promised and failed to rectify.

Iraq: I listened to former CBS Iraq correspondent turned Associated Press intelligence 
writer Kimberly Dozier, who was seriously injured in a car-bombing in Baghdad in 2006 
which killed her driver and the US serviceman she was travelling with, speak on how 
investigative journalists in the wake of 9/11 navigate the disinformation minefields laid 
by intelligence agents. With the very reasons for the Iraq War incontrovertibly shown to 
be bogus, investigative journalists were increasingly called on to negotiate these 
minefields on behalf of a public that prefers its information stripped down to 
near-meaningless sound-bites and tweets.

And back home in America: a visit to the Washington Post was notable for my guide, the 
Ombudsman, talking about how the newspaper had been forced to adopt a sophisticated 
mail-handling system to neutralise anthrax, or other attacks by mail; in some respects, 
the chickens had come home to roost. Later, I visited the colourful yet calm Occupy Wall 
Street sit-in in New York City on the on the contested anniversary of “Columbus Day”, a 
foundational part of the American myth, with its prevailing anti-war sentiment, where a 
former US Marine made a name for himself on television by defending protestors attacked by 
the police, saying that he had not fought abroad to defend police brutality at home. But 
the characterisation by so many people I spoke to of the Occupy Movement as 
“revolutionary” shows how far removed from reality is their understanding of the balance 
of forces in their own society.
It is clear to me that Americans, being unaccustomed to protest that does more than merely 
“speak truth to power,” with their organised working class long since domesticated and 
integrated into the relative benefits of the system (even though it is largely the poor 
and working class that forms the bulk of its footsoldiers (3)), have no real notion of how 
to grasp the nettle of power much beyond the ritual of voting or abstaining. So, despite 
this marginal domestic dissent, with the “borders” of the US now considered strategically 
to be located at the frontlines in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Colombia, Jamaica and elsewhere, 
the war has clearly been successfully globalised by the military-industrial complex. So 
the question then, was: what was the effect of being perpetually at war with the world 
mean to the American people themselves?
Homegrown Hate

It would be disingenuous to suggest that America’s threats all originated with foreign 
devils; after all, the 1995 Oklahoma Bombing was clearly a homegrown affair, committed by 
outriders of the persistent ultra-Right tendency within the American body politic which on 
the one hand takes America’s founding documents such as the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution with its early Amendments (including the right to bear arms) 
literally as the word of God, interpreted in a racial-nativist manner, while on the other 
hand seditiously attempts to strip the American Revolution of its ossified aspects 
(including federal institutions such as the Federal Reserve Bank), desiring a return to a 
presumed purer, original Revolution in which the county sheriff is the highest authority, 
taxation is abolished, and a rugged autonomous individualism prevails (4).

In order to understand domestic terrorism, in New Orleans, I listened to Southern Poverty 
Law Centre (SPLC) intelligence project director Heidi Beirich speak on the demographic and 
economic drivers behind the rise of domestic hate groups. The SPLC was founded in 1981 and 
has carved out a niche for itself as a key provider of intelligence on, and interdictor 
of, hate groups ranging from Neo-Nazis and the Klan, to the Nation of Islam and Radical 
Traditional Catholics, though two-thirds of them are white-supremacist, with 602 white 
nationalist groups in 2000, rising to more than 1,000 today.

Beirich said there was a “frightening” proliferation of hate groups over the past decade, 
since 9/11, and especially since Obama’s election: while the FBI claimed about 800 hate 
crimes were committed each year; the Bureau of Justice Statistics put the figure at 
200,000/year.

Few hate groups are specifically anti-gay, and yet the reversal of the 
“don’t-ask-don’t-tell” policy on gays in the military erupted into the mainstream during 
my visit, with Republican politicians in a TV debate totally ignoring a question posed by 
an openly gay soldier via video-feed from Afghanistan – despite the fact that he was 
clearly serving his country on the frontline – while in North Carolina, legislative 
opposition to gay marriage was the big culture-war issue of the day. And although few hate 
groups are focused exclusively on the anti-immigration cause, the drastically changed 
ethnic demography of the US was a clear driver of hate: in 1970, Beirich said, the US 
population was 83% white; but that figure had dropped to 66% today; and by 2050, the white 
population was predicted to fall under 50%.

Fears of being culturally overwhelmed by assimilation-resistant non-whites lay behind the 
controversial new immigration law, passed in Alabama while I was there, which made it a 
criminal offence to be found to be an undocumented immigrant in the state. The law was 
passed despite the fact that it was targeted at a tiny population of only 130,000 out of 
4,7-million Alabama residents. The day it was passed, weird scenes unfolded as scores of 
immigrant families fled the state, leaving keys to homes with sympathetic neigbours and 
hungry dogs roaming the streets.

A second key driver of hate was the parlous state of the economy after the sub-prime 
housing boom imploded and the banks responsible were bailed out by the taxpayer victims; 
this, against a backdrop of longer-term deindustrialisation which has seen factory 
capacity relocate to under-unionised developing countries, leaving former industrial 
cities such as Detroit transformed into eerie wastelands, with vacant lots, boarded 
hotels, looted doctors’ surgeries, vandalised concert halls, and abandoned apartments with 
food rotting in the fridges (5).

And lastly, the election of the first black president – an initially successful attempt by 
the US oligarchy to divert attention from the bailout of the banks – provoked an 
ultra-Right backlash that resonated beyond its usual backwoods militia bunkers: 
grade-schoolers on an Oklahoma bus were reported recently to have chanted “Assassinate Obama!”

And yet, Beirich noted, Muslims rather than the domestic ultra-Right have borne the brunt 
of investigations. An example of this Islamophobia was an instructor at the FBI base at 
Quantico, Virginia, who told his trainees that if a citizen was Muslim and religious, they 
were automatically suspect, and that the Qu’ran had come to Mohammed in an epileptic fit; 
trainees complained, the instructor was removed and all FBI training materials on religion 
and culture are currently under review. To interrogate this further, I attended debate at 
Duke on “the Radicalisation of Muslims in America.”
Muslims in America

Setting the scene by saying that the profiling of Muslims was out of proportion to the 
actual threat they represented, Prof Charles Kurzman of the University of North Carolina, 
said: “About 20 individuals per year are suspects, with no identifiable ethnic or 
citizenship profile. Most plots are disrupted before they acquire their materials or 
select their targets – and one this year was a Shi’ite planning an attack on a Sunni 
mosque. There have been only 35 murders [in the US] associated with Muslims since 9/11 – 
out of 150,000 murders a year. Since 2008, there have been 700,000 murders world-wide of 
which only 15,000 deaths have been associated with Muslim terrorism – excluding Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The world is safer from terrorism than at any time since the 
1970s.”

Kurzman went on to quote two recent surveys of public opinion in America, the one on 
Islam, in which half the respondents had positive attitudes, and the other on Muslims, in 
which 66% had positive attitudes. This, he said, indicated that while most Americans were 
ambivalent about the religion, most were also warmly disposed towards “real, living 
people,” their Muslim neighbours.

Prof David Schanzer, director of the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 
an institute with direct intelligence community involvement, responded in similar vein, 
saying that the sample of home-soil American Muslim terror threats was “so small that it 
is difficult to do retroactive causal analysis. The fairest answer to why Muslims are 
radicalising is: we don’t know. There is no profile of the ‘homegrown terrorist’.” The 
claim that religiosity drove radicalism was “not true, and discredited by many studies: 
out of the 188 individuals in the data-set, some never became pious at all; one’s 
grievance was related to an uncle killed in an American drone attack,” he said, hinting 
that the intimate impact of US foreign policy was a factor. Kurzman said that in recent 
“Homeland Security closed sessions,” it had been noted that many radical bloggers had, in 
fact, little knowledge of Islam.

Schanzer referred to a 2008 debate in the New York Times between Dr Marc Sageman who 
stressed “self-radicalising individuals” and Bruce Hoffman who stressed organised 
recruitment by terrorists in the US (6), saying “There are many pathways to 
radicalisation.” Asked whether he thought mental illness played any role, Kurzman said: 
“Many of these individuals are isolated from their communities; these lone wolves are not 
weeded out. But recruited terrorists weed out psychotics because they are considered too 
unstable to be effective.”

Imam Abdullah Antepli, the Duke Muslim Chaplain, a fiery yet moderate Muslim of Turkish 
extraction who conducts theological training for young imams in Afghanistan, laid the 
blame directly at the door of the US’s creation of proxy armed forces abroad: “The 
historical roots of this lie in Afghanistan in the 1980s. I remember the US back then 
idealising the same people we are chasing now. Our tax money played an extensive role in 
creating this cancer; we created this monster by our support for the Mujaheddin and we can 
trace the ideological hotbed of US Muslim extremism to our relationship to the Saudi 
regime… Religious money is exporting poison.” Kurzman responded, however, that “in the US, 
only a handful of suspects are connected to Saudi- or Middle East-funded outfits; 
terrorist attacks are cheap and you don’t need Saudi money.”

In terms of Muslim voting patterns, especially in the swing states of Florida, Ohio and 
Michigan, where there are concentrations of Muslim voters: studies showed a total US 
Muslim population, mostly Sunni, of 2.75-million – 45% of whom had entered the US in the 
past 25 years – of whom about 1,5-million were of voting age; although they tended to vote 
70% Democrat, 11% Republican, and the rest Independent, there was no “Muslim vote” per se 
as the putative “community” was fractured by race, ethnicity, class and country of origin 
and they tended to vote in synch with their neighbours.

So while cultural wars over gays and immigrants, homegrown hate, and Muslim terrorism 
vexes Homeland Security, they should weigh very little in the scales – and yet are 
accorded disproportional importance as a threat partly justifying US gunboat diplomacy.
The Shape of Future War

What will a future American-lead perpetual war look like? If the Republicans can be 
believed, when (for it is only a matter of time) they reacquire the Oval Office, it seems 
we are in for “Intervention Lite,” a return to a form of 1930s isolationism, but with very 
targeted penetrations abroad – not unlike, perhaps the (failed) 1927-1932 combat in 
Nicaragua against Augusto Sandino’s “Light and Truth” liberated zone.

According to Prof Charles Hermann, of the conservative Bush School of Government and 
Public Service in Texas (7), the ideal “over-the-horizon” military policy of a future 
Republican administration (and thus of NATO as well) involved strategic support for 
regimes that were prepared to hold regular elections, in order to prevent them spiraling 
downwards into failed states. Hermann asked whether the NATO intervention in Libya in 
2011, nominally to prevent human rights abuses against the rebels by the regime, had not 
been its last hurrah, suggesting that if British and French defence spending continued at 
current levels, those two US allies would be unable to stage a repeat of Libya.

But the US, despite itself being hit by financial crisis, recession and a soaring national 
debt at 90% of GDP, driven by the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, the Department of Defence’s 
$675-billion/year budget had ballooned by 80% since 9/11. Hermann said that some of this 
defence spending was given flight by scare-mongering over the intentions of China, North 
Korea and Iran, but he felt that these were overstated: “I see this as a management 
problem, as they are running countries and are interested in staying in power.”

Hermann quoted Robert Gates, former Defense Secretary under President George W Bush and 
now Dean of the Bush School, saying that “fractured or failing states are the main 
security threat of our times,” adding that Oxford economist Prof Paul Collier noted that 
there was a remarkable overlap between failed states and the “bottom billion” of the 
world’s poor, resulting in bad governments and recurrent coups (Mali in West Africa, which 
has recently experienced a coup as I write this, is the third-poorest nation on earth).

So how would a Republican-run military-industrial complex wage war, via NATO in 
particular? Hermann recommended an “over-the-horizon” support role: “We’re not trying to 
overthrow bad governments [à-la Iraqi “regime change”]; we’re providing security for good 
governments – the reverse of [NATO policy in] Bosnia-Herzegovina – if you develop and 
allow free and fair elections.” So the bottom billion will be left to rot, but what would 
NATO do about bad governments like Syria? “If they don’t get on board, we leave them 
alone. I don’t think we have the resources, and to be honest, the political will, to 
overthrow the bad guys.” On the other hand, support for “good governments,” based on 
contracts with client states which would involve grooming the younger, upwardly-mobile 
middle officer castes, could embrace African states such as Nigeria and Kenya – to prevent 
the spread of the Arab Spring south of the Sahara, Hermann said.

Precisely what impact the global economic crisis will have on American military strategy 
in future is far from clear, however. Take, for instance, the remarkable way in which the 
Pentagon views itself. I managed to secure access to this enormous complex of 23,500 
workers (top-heavy with brass: 70% of the military staff are officers) with its 
Humvee-wide corridors and its courtyard Ground Zero Café above which any future enemy 
ICBMs would detonate dead-centre, having recognised the building’s unique geometry 
incoming from space, as a journalist, not a civilian, which perhaps explains the following.

Bryan Whitman, the Principal Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (8), had 
just expounded on how the US military operated globally, across all time-zones, 
underscoring the unusual degree of personal latitude allowed by the Pentagon to its 
regional commanders, whose six regional combatant commands divide the Earth like segments 
of a giant orange: “We plan centrally and operate decentrally, so the field commanders 
have a lot of autonomy. The ambassadors [under the State Department] focus on their own 
country [of posting] but the commanders [under the Pentagon] look at regional security (9).”

I responded that seeing as how the US military had this enormous 24-hour global presence, 
with its own state-like infrastructure (housing, engineering, social services, etc), 
massive staff and facilities (some ZIP codes are those floating cities called aircraft 
carriers), and heavily-armed semi-autonomous regional forces, and given that the military 
officer caste was largely unaffected by changes in whichever political party rotated 
through the White House and therefore could devise longer-term strategies than the State 
Department whose foreign policy was bound to the incumbent Presidency – given all that, 
was the US military not in fact a parallel world government?

Whitman gave me a long, penetrating look, and then said “I think you have answered your 
own question” – which to me was a remarkably frank admission from the senior ranks about 
how the military-industrial complex viewed itself superior to the elected Presidency (10).

The implication of this in Africa, was implied by Pentagon spokesman and legal expert 
David Oten who said direct military-to-military co-operation was often one of the best 
ways for the US to engage diplomatically “because often the [African] military is the only 
centre of national power – there is no strong legislature, etc.”

In sum, I suspect that the Whitmans of the Pentagon will prevail over the Hermanns or 
whoevers of the forseeable-future White House. But it would be a mistake to cartoon the 
Whitmans as boorish hawks committed to bombing-for-profit; on the contrary, his caste are 
sophisticated navigators of the brave new world: “Just because CNN, etcetera asks me a 
question, how should I rank that against a guy who runs a blog in Bolivia that covers all 
of Latin America and that everyone reads?”

Lieutenant-Colonel Todd Breasseale, former spokesman for NATO’s International Security 
Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) and now the Pentagon spokesperson on Western 
Hemisphere policy, detainee affairs (including Guantanamo) and US Southern Command 
(Mexico-to-Antarctica), was even more disarming, describing ex-Marine turned Al Jazeera 
journalist Josh Rushing who resigned from the military after being ordered by the Pentagon 
not to speak to the media about his experiences managing information flow during the Iraq 
War, as “a revolutionary, a young, thinking officer who was engaging at a time of war. The 
Marines froze him out and treated him so poorly; he quit on principle – a very valid 
principle – and now runs the brilliant show Front Lines,” which covers the impact of US 
foreign policy in the Americas. “Now the Marine Corps has him speak to them about their 
mistakes. That’s progress.”

I had met Rushing the day before and he was honestly described. But before we are too 
charmed, here is that language again: the institutional-revolutionary mission of America 
in waging war abroad.
Conclusion: Perpetual Institutional-Revolutionary War?

So, what to make of a country where the home front is so apparently placid that walls 
around homes are a rarity, and car crashes rate high on state-wide news programmes – and 
yet which wages war across a globe it considers its own? For one thing, the 1823 Monroe 
Doctrine that treated Latin America as the back-yard of the US, providing the rationale 
for interventions everywhere from Argentina to Cuba, has clearly long been updated to 
embrace the whole post-Soviet world.

Regarding the American public’s investment in this vision, Breasseale estimated that “less 
than 1% have some involvement with the military, but the American people spend a lot of 
money on defence. Every time we lose someone in combat, we put out a press release, 
because we don’t want to ever hide the true cost – in blood.”

That’s all very well, but it implies a deep level of disconnection between where and why 
American blood is spilled, and the populace who politically enable their youth to go off 
and fight obscure battles. And I’m not sure I agree with Breasseale: the presence of the 
military is hard to avoid in American civilian life. From the National Guard recruiting at 
the Society of Professional Journalists’ annual conference – of all things! – to the 
almost unquestioned presence on college campuses of students in uniform and of Reserve 
Officer Training Corps recruiters (the 1970 Kent State Shootings are a distant memory), 
from a Medal of Honor recipient opening the New York Stock Exchange, to the returnees 
greeted at airports by girls wearing military-groupie T-shirts, from the steady trickle of 
bodies coming home through the giant military morgue at Dover, to the veteran-themed 
country fairs, it is obvious that the military is a permanent yet strangely 
under-recognised feature of American civilian consciousness.

The US just doesn’t feel like a country at war. And yet, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert 
“Disaster Bob” Ditchey, a Secretary of Defense spokesman who holds the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) portfolio for the US, Canada and Mexico, co-ordinating DHS, US 
Northern Command (US and Canada), and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD, 
the joint US-Canadian aerospace defence system), told me that on Obama’s initiative, 1,200 
National Guardsmen were now helping police the border with Mexico; clearly even the Obama 
regime had felt the need to respond militarily to the widespread domestic fears of illegal 
immigration run out of control. Clearly, whether Republican or Democrat, “keeping things 
down on the farm” by force of arms is still considered a domestic political necessity.

It also needs to be stressed that the supposedly kinder, gentler Obama regime (in 2007, 
before attaining office, Obama renounced the first-strike use of nuclear weapons) has also 
embarked on the largest-ever refurbishment and expansion of America’s nuclear warfare 
capacity, a programme that will run for several decades after Obama retires (11). This is 
clear evidence of an incumbent president serving the longer-range interests of the 
military-industrial complex rather than even his own party’s medium-term interests.

When I visited the US last, it was the year 1984 and many people were throwing parties 
mocking George Orwell’s great dystopian novel 1984, saying smugly to each other, “see how 
wrong he was?” But they missed the point: the totalitarian hyperpower Oceania of Orwell’s 
tale draws its legitimacy from its geopolitical backdrop: a far-off, possibly fake, yet 
endless war with their seamlessly alternating enemies, Eurasia and Eastasia. I had the 
eerie sense on this visit, 27 years later, that a substantial part of the US citizenry 
themselves had become pilotless drones, operating against a backdrop of a far-off war 
that, like the citizenry of Oceania, left them physically unaffected – but which yet 
required their ideological acquiescence.

The great French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in 1840 in his landmark work 
Democracy in America: “No protracted war can fail to endanger the freedom of a democratic 
country… it must invariably and immeasurably increase the powers of civil government, it 
must compulsorily concentrate the direction of all men and the management of all things in 
the hands of the administration. If it does not lead to despotism by sudden violence, it 
prepares men for it more gently by their habits.”

A unipolar hyperpower, its citizenry gently prepared by a perpetual war that is more 
wallpaper to their daily habits than painful first-hand experience, for the concentration 
not of the powers of civil government – but of the powers of a military-industrial caste 
erudite yet far more seditious of elected democracy than any on the political fringes, 
armed with world-ending weaponry and a messianic sense of revolutionary right and 
unassailable mission, such a power has as much potential to be a long-term destabilising, 
as well as stabilising, factor on the world stage.

Michael Schmidt

FOOTNOTES:

1) An erudite examination of the shifts in these regional dynamics since the height of the 
Vietnam War is given in Jeremy Black, Altered States: America since the Sixties, Reaktion 
Books, London, UK, 2006.

2) It is 150 years since the North’s still-controversial “Restoration” of the South 
following the Civil War, which critics call the imposition by force of alien values on 
Southerners, and an argument was raging during my visit in one North Carolina town about 
whether to restore to its place of public prominence a Confederate statue damaged in a van 
accident.

3) A great cultural reference for the desperation that drives the poor into the US 
military, which offers them not only employment but the chance to get bursaries to study, 
is the harrowing film Winter’s Bone, starring Jennifer Lawrence, directed by Debra Granik, 
screenplay by Granik and Anne Rosellini, USA, 2010.

4) A good exposition of the root elements and flowering of this ultra-Right is James 
Coates, Armed and Dangerous: the Rise of the Survivalist Right, Hill and Wang, New York 
City, USA, 1995. Coats repeatedly mentions, but seemingly fails to appreciate, the poverty 
which drove many of those he describes into extremism; perhaps this is why many 
ultra-Right themes in America are shared by the ultra-Left. Given that Coates’s book is 
outdated, being a reprint of a 1987 text, an update on the religious ultra-Right is 
provided by Chris Hedges, American Fascists: the Christian Right and the War on America, 
Vintage, London, UK, 2008. There was a restricted gathering of such ultra-Right groups in 
the Appalachian Mountains during my trip.

5) For a chilling photographic essay on Detroit’s decline, take a look at Yves Marchand 
and Romain Meffre’s work online at www.marchandmeffre.com. Detroit was where the alleged 
“Underwear Bomber” stood trial during my visit, while Michigan state was home to a man 
arrested for planning to fly radio-controlled model aircraft armed with bombs into the 
Pentagon and the US Capitol.

6) Sageman is a former CIA operative based in Pakistan in 1987-1989, now anti-terrorism 
consultant, and author of Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, USA, 2008. Hoffman is Director of the 
Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, a specialist in terrorism 
and counter-insurgency, editor-in-chief of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and the 
series editor of Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. Their debate is 
outlined in "A Not Very Private Feud Over Terrorism": 
www.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/weekinreview/08sciolino.html.

7) Why focus on the Republicans only here? We know how a Democrat regime currently wages 
war and we can expect more of the same if Obama wins; while the recession has clearly 
altered Republican objectives since the Bush era. I also met with representatives of the 
American constructivist far Right, and constructivist far Left, by which I distinguish 
them from the demolitionist terrorist ultras of both stripes: the Libertarian Party on the 
Right is minimum-state, minimum-war capitalist; the North-Eastern Federation of Anarchist 
Communists (NEFAC) on the Left argued for an anti-war decentralist community control of 
the economy. The Libertarian Party has a marginal electoral showing (4% in the 2008 
Presidential elections) and NEFAC had just split into revolutionary and moderate projects. 
But despite the intriguing arguments both sides could mount, they are both too far from 
the levers of power in America to have any impact on how, let alone whether, the US wages war.

8) Whitman’s official bio is online at 
www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=212.

9) For instance, the new Africa Command (Africom) has now calved off European Command 
(Eucom), which covers Europe and North Africa, because Sub-Saharan Africa is 
geopolitically detached from North Africa and Europe. Africom is still headquartered in 
Stuttgart, Germany, and has yet to find a home in Africa, though Ghana and South Africa 
are contenders. Africom is the aegis for the Africa-dedicated components of the US Air 
Force, US Marine Corps, and Special Operations (based in Germany), US Navy and US Army 
(based in Italy), and the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (based at Camp 
Lemonnier, Djibouti).

10) Beyond the Presidency’s considerable powers, including the President’s as 
commander-in-chief of all US armed forces, there exist three large, yet less visible and 
mostly unaccountable and unelected centres of power in the US: firstly the 
military-industrial complex itself; secondly the state bureaucracy, one of the world’s 
largest and most powerful, which, like the military-industrial complex, has its own 
strategic foreign interests separate to those of the incumbent Presidency and which 
because it is likewise unelected has longer tenure in office and thus longer-range 
objectives than incumbent parties; and lastly the plutocracy, the wealthy old-boys’ club 
of lobbyists from Washington, Silicon Valley, Houston and elsewhere who push their own 
private agenda, including the US-supremacist “Project for an American Century.”

11) See Darwin Bond-Graham, "Obama’s Worst Sell-out?", Counter-punch, USA, September 
23-25, 2011.
_________________________________________
A - I N F O S  N E W S  S E R V I C E
By, For, and About Anarchists
Send news reports to A-infos-en mailing list
A-infos-en@ainfos.ca
Subscribe/Unsubscribe http://ainfos.ca/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/a-infos-en
Archive: http://ainfos.ca/en