A-Infos (en) Russia, Anarchists and the Second Chechen War* - Situation in Northern Caucasus and Libertarian reaction (1/2)

It is of little doubt that the total failure of any attempts to oppose the Second Chechen 
War was the most bitter defeat of the Russian anarchist movement during the past decade. A 
feeling of total powerlesness in front of the brutal realities of the Chechenyan 
meat-grinder was pressing so heavily on the imagination of anti-authoritarians during the 
first half of the decade, that the movement was onlyable to recovere slightly when the
intensity of the war gradually calmed down. ---- One may say, that the Second Chechen war 
started the 26th of August 1999, when the air force of the Russian Federation bombed 
Grozny and other parts of Ichkeria, and ended the 31st of October 2007, when 
pro-separatist websites published the announcement of Dokku Umarov, that the Ichkerian 
Republic had been dissolved and replaced by the Caucasus Emirate. Of course, the war still
goes on and various armed attacks take place on an almost weekly basis, but
the goal of the rebels is no longer the national independence of Ichkeria,
but the formation of a theocratic state that would unite the whole North
Caucasus. The Chechen nationalist resistance was marginalized, and in
practice is no longer a  significant force. This war may be seen as a
continuation of the general ÂNorth-Caucasian WarÂ, which began with the
attack by Islamist fighters on Dagestan the 7th of August 1999, although,
even before there had been significant islamist attacks, such as the attack
by emir Khattab against the 136th motorized batallion in Buynaksk the 22nd of
December 1997. Islamists were never likely to be satisfied with the
Khasyavyurt agreements of 1996. Islamism is fundamentally an anti-nationalist
ideology, thus the formation of a nation state cannot be be the goal of
islamists.

Thus, the coup of October 2007 means the end of one era and the beginning of a
new one, therefore making now the time to make some summary of the anarchist
success, or more exactly the lack of it, in the struggle against the
imperialist war in the Northern Caucasus during last 8 years.

A libertarian take on Islamism

If for liberal opponents of the war an Islamist victory over nationalists
within the Chechen resistance was a reason to mourn, anarchists look upon
this infighting as rather neutral observers. Anarchists were never up for
picking the Âlesser evil between nationalists and Islamists, or between
separatism and federalism, or between Bolshevism, fascism and capitalism or
any other authoritarian ideology whatsoever. Anarchist communism is not about
waiting for the Âright conditionsÂ, however even though it cannot be realized
over night, neither can it be achieved  through any type of  state system.
This of course does not mean that anarchists are for the Status Quo â there
is always an alternative, decentralized, non-hierarchical scenario for the
development of the social conflicts.

Obviously Islamist concepts in terms of sexual freedom and the position of
women seem very backward, but one should also point out that in comparison
with other authoritarian movements, Islamism also has its good sides.
Islamism refuses any ideas on the superiority of one Ânation or Ârace over
another, and also proposes some limits on neoliberal capitalism, such as a
ban on interest. It underlines the importance of social responsibility,
although does not criticizing capitalism in those terms. In Lebanon and
Palestine Islamists won the trust of the oppressed through social initiatives
and a principled stance against corruption. In Chechnya, the support of
international Islamists played a role, but the real key reason for the
victory of the Islamists within the resistance were the common goals  of
Islamists throughout the entire Northern Caucasus, which provided a chance to
set up a wider movement crossingnational boundaries. Also in the context of a
general collapse of the formerly developed society, Islam as a more archaic
institution was providing some rudimentary social structure, just as it did
in Afganistan in the 1990's and in Somalia today.

Currently praise and even conversion to Islam is a trendy phenomena among
Western (and not only) leftists, and there are even modern attempts of
synthesis between Islam and anarchism, but one should take them with a grain
of salt. Islam is obviously not the equivalent of Islamism, the former is an
ancient religion which allows for a wide spectrum of interpretations, and the
latter is a modern ideology, far more restrictive. But Islam is the only
religion,amongst the major world religions, founded by a politician, and
these origins of Islam have given it a certain modern flavour in comparison
with the others. That is, it is more fit for state governance than other
ancient religions. If one day there will be an anti-authoritarian Islam
besides  modern Islamism, there is little doubt that religious
interpretations of the former will be vastly different from the
interpretations of the latter.

Howeveranarchists should also not regress to the level of demonizing Islamism.
Islamism is no more dangerous, or more cruel than any other authoritarian
ideology. Declarations such as ÂIslamism is fascismÂ, which one can hear from
sources as diverse as government authorities to certain anarchists, are just
ridiculous. Obviously, modern Islam did not develop in a vacuum â it has been
influenced by fascism, socialism and other Western ideologies. However, it is
not a subcategory of any of them, but an ideology in its own right, and it
accepts a wide range of different social structures, from the absolute
monarchy of Saudi Arabia to the theoratic republic of Iran.

Islamism is not the same thing as Wahhabism. The main inspiration of all
Islamists is modern Iran, which is not Wahhabist but Shiite. That is,
Islamism is a modern ideology (or more exactly â many ideologies), which does
not have an exact correspondence with any of the ancient branches of the
religion. The Wahhabist movement, originatin 18th century Saudi Arabia, is
certainly one of the sources of modern islamist thinking, but no less
important is for example the tradition of the Moslem Brotherhood, founded in
Egypt in 1928, and the teachings of its main ideologue Sayyid Qutb.

Thereis little doubt that we will often face Islamists in a common field of
struggle as, in many regions of the former Soviet Union, they are the only
force which can challenge the corrupt despotism of government officials.
Under these circumstances it would be a grave mistake to present Islamists as
a greater evil, since the reasons for thesupport Islamists have are obvious.
It would also be a grave mistake to propose any kind of tactical cooperation
with Islamists.  Notwithstanding their superficial criticism of capitalism,
modern Islamism is not even feudalist, but an all-out bourgeois movement with
some theocratical flavor. We will not be doing any better, if all-out corrupt
heirs of the Soviet nomenclature in Middle-Asia or Northern Caucasus were to
be replaced by Islamists. The history of the most recent 5000 years proves,
that no religion can save a human being from tmoral degradation, which is the
clear consequence of having any authority over another.

Who won the Second Chechen War?

I make a conscious decision to not label the Islamists of Northern Caucasus as
Wahhabites , since that would be a simplification â for example Dokka Umarov
considers himself a follower of Sufi Islam, traditional in Chechnya. However,
the Wahhabist segment played a significant role in the conflict, as it was
the factor which caused the split of Chechen society during the course of the
Second War.

Akhmat Kadyrov was a significant factor in the success of the Federal forces.
Kadyrov was the Chief Mufti of Ichkeria, defending the interests of the Sufi
school, traditional in Chechnya, against expansion of Wahhabism. Starting
with October 1998, several attempts were made on his life  in Chechnya, ,
after which there was no doubt left as to the fact that Wahhabite influence
in Chechnya was incompatible with his life. Thus the federal forces got a
very valuable ally, whereas Maskhadov and the rest of the Âhalf-secularÂ
authorities were trying to avoid any clear conflict with the IslamistsAfter
the start of the Second War, Maskhadov and the national resistance could not
refuse open cooperation with the Islamists, but this alliance was far more
beneficial for the latter. The situation Âbetween the lines of fire was a
big disanvantage for the national resistance, and thus its influence had
already vanished long before Maskhadov was killed, on the 8th of March 2005.
During his struggle underground, Maskhadov condemned the deeds of Basayev and
other commanders of the Islamist resistance against peaceful people, however
he did little to interfere â not that he really even could. It is unlikely
that Maskhadov was in a position to sidetrack Basayev, and Basayev was also
an useful scarecrow, which could be shown to the whole word: ÂIf you are not
going to negotiate with me, you will have to talk with himÂ.

For Kadyrov the elder, it was far easier to persuade field commanders to
surrender than it was for the federal troops, as he washimself a living
example of the opportunities switching sides would permit turncoats. Alu
Alkhanov, the Chechen president to follow Kadyrov the elder, was the last
representative of the original anti-Dudayev opposition of 1994 who heldany
significiant position in Chechnya. Since Kadyrov the younger sidetracked
Alkhanov, any leading positions in the republic have been promptly put in
hands of former resistance fighters. Thus, Kadyrov the younger could move on
with his goal to gain total hegemony in the republic, and start eliminating
the influence of all federal forces inside the Republic. The bold and
unpunished execution of the former commander of the ÂMountaineer detachment,
Movdavi Baysarov, in the center of Moscow in 2006, and the expulsion of Sulim
Yamadaev from the post of commander of the special battallion of the Ministry
of Defence ÂVostok (East) in April of 2008 show, that Kadyrov is in a
position to reach for this goal (after the first version of this article was
published, Yamadayev was assasinated in Dubai â the police of the Emirates
has issued an international search warrant on a number of Kadyrov's
associates involved in the assasination, but obviously they have nothing to
be worried about in Russia). Since Kadyrov's allies are also involved in the
hostile and violent takeovers of companies controlled by Chechen businessmen
outside of Chechnya, one may not describe the relation of Kadyrov the younger
to federal authorities in 21st century terms, but rather it is something like
the relation between a King and a Duke. The ÂDukeÂ, that is Kadyrov the
younger, is allowed to do whatever he likes in Chechnya, such as setting up
private torture prisons on his own estates. The influence of federal
authorities in Chechnya is even weaker than during Dudayev's time, as back
then an opposition still existed which was capable of acting, and at times
Dudayev was only in control of the capital of the republic. Chechen
nationalists were refused formal sovereignity and independent foreign
policies, but in exchange they received generous federal subsidies and an
amount of authority  inside Âtheir republic, of which leaders of other
subjects of Russian Federation can only dream about.

Today Chechnya is an extremely authoritarian republic, and it is impossible to
estimate the real level of support that Kadyrov can claim. The fact that a
number of influential field commanders are still hiding in the republic (or
surrounding areas) shows, that the resistance has not completely lost its
support. However there is no doubt that Kadyrov's politics, despite the many
controversies, are supported by a substantial part of the population. First
of all this is due to the improvement in living conditions, as well as a far
better safety situation than during either of the periods of independence
(1991-1994 and 1996-1999). But the support for Kadyrov the younger is also
due to fact that he managed to prove that he is not a simple marionet, and
that in a certain sense he is proceeding with his original nationalist
project. Chechnya, is currently one of the most ethnically homogenous
territories in Europe, and power (both civil and military) is completely in
the hands of former national separatists. Everyone understands, that when the
following cycle of weakening of the central state in Russia starts (which
sooner or later will undoubtedly happen  â in 50, 100 or 200 years), there is
no force which can hold Chechnya in Moscow's authority.

Obviously, for anarchists, all this intrigue is secondary â hostage taking and
de-facto competition between the federal troops and the resistance, as to
which of them manages to kill more of its hostages, is just a detail of the
general bloody tragedy. 100 victims of the hostage taking in Dubrovka and 300
in Beslan are just a minor part of the general picture of tens of thousands
of victims murdered and maimed. War is always an unprincipled and bloody
business, and if sometimes one manages to set the rules of the game, it is
only when following the rules is beneficial for all sides of the conflict. In
the case of the second Chechen war however, neither side made such attempts,
thus everyone bears responsibility for what happened.

In the end, what happened in Buynaksk, Volgodonsk, Moscow and Ryazan between
the 31st of August and 22nd of September 1999 is also secondary. Yes, much is
unclear with this history, expecially in regards to Ryazan, and in case we
win at one point (and most likely only in that case) all of this will be
investigated. But thus far the Âalternative version of the story remains
unfinished, and I am certain that things would have developed the same way
even without the explosions. Public opinion was not even close to stopping
the First Chechen war, which halted only after the military success of the
resistance. Thus in 1999 the state could easily have gone on with the war
even without the explosions.

And in the end, who won? Obviously, nationalist turncoats won â they did not
receive  formal independence, but their real power vastly exceeds the power
of the average politician today, the latter's hands usually, being tied by a
number of international agreements. There is also no doubt, that the federal
athorities and Chekist (FSB operative) clique, which has conslidated all
power in Russia to its hands in the past past 8 years, also won â they were
forced to give all power within Chechnya to former nationalists, but now they
no longer have to worry about the massive human toll of Âmaintaining the
integrity of the countryÂ, and its consequence, a dissatisfied public. In a
certain sense the Islamists also won â they have no chance to realise their
political ambitions during the next decades, but they've gained a practical
monopoly over the guerilla struggle in Russia. Amongst the various  warring
fractions, only one has undoubtedly lost â that is the nationalist
resistance. And what aboutthose who did not wage war? They are clearly on the
loosing side â hundreds of thousands of physically and mentally crippled
people will pass the trauma of war onto second and third generations.

Lessons from the Chechen revolution


What happened in Chechnya between 1991 and1994 is yet another example of the
moral failure of national liberation ideology. The Dudayev regime was not
able to stop the robbery and ethnic cleansing of and violence done to Terek
Cossacks, who've lived at least since the 16th century in territories which
were, probably, prior to the 1950's never settled by the Vainakh (Chechen and
Ingushetian people) and other inhabitants of the republic, who found
themselves in a vulnerable position after the collapse of the Soviet system
of administration. I do not want to describe these events as a Âgenocide as
I am an opponent of the semantical inflation this word has suffered during
the last 20 years, but it is a well-established fact that in that period,
anyone not supported by more archaic social structures (families, clans,
religion), could suffer in Chechnya.

It would be a crude simplification to describe the regime change in Chechnya
in 1991 as a Âcoup d'ÃtatÂ. As a matter of fact, a real revolution took place
in Chechnya, perhaps the most fundamental among all of those which took place
in the former Eastern Bloc 1989-1991. If in Central Europe, and especially in
the USSR changes were pretty much controlled and manipulated by
representatives of the nomenclatura itself, or the intelligentsia creating
the opposition, in Chechnya the lower stratum of society was much more
involved than in any other place. If Dudayev and his closest circle came from
the nomenclature, the main protagonist of the revolution was not the
discontent in this stratum, but within the most marginal elements of the
society: elderly victims of the 1944 deportation, rural and unemployed youth.
This was due to the character of the Soviet system in Chechnya. Whereas
national quotas were carefully preserved in the highest posts of the
republic, technical professions requiring a high level of specialisation were
closed for Chechens. Thus, besides a few representatives of the nomenclature
and intelligentsia, the vast majority of Chechens were working either in
agriculture, or at the lowest level of the city economics. This was due to
the high fertility rate (which in part was a consequence of the collective
trauma of deportation) and limited possibilities, as well as the fact that
since the mid 1980's more and more of the population had gotten involved in
the marginal and criminal segments of the economy. These people never
received anything from the Soviet authority, and they had every reason to
hate everyone who successfully integrated into the system.

In 1991 it was payback time, and the opportunity was eagerly seized. Not only
did the non-ethnic population escape from Chechnya, but a majority of the
former intelligentsia escaped as well. It would, however, be a simplification
to say that the conflict was purely national â besides the conflict between
the ethnic and non-ethnic population, there were also conflicts between the
proletariat on one side and the intelligentsia and former nomenclature on the
other, and apart from the latter two a conflict between the rural population
and the city dwellers. As the Soviet system did not provide the protagonists
of the revolution with the necessary skills of governing a modern state, what
took place in Chechnya was a process of Âdemodernization with more archaic
social forms (such as religion and the clan) replacing the modern ones.In the
process of intermixing with modern capitalism, this took on a corrupted,
deformed form. For example, in the ancient mountaineer society, the
institution of slavery (which is actually hardly real slavery, thus it is
even misleading to call it so) was first and foremost a form of social
protection for vulnerable people, a way to feed those who had no family or
clan to take care of them. Now economic interests came to play, and the
traditionally humane institution of Âslavery was transformed into a highly
profitable trade of humans, which in between 1996 and 1999 reached such a
scale, that it became the main source of foreign currency in the republic.
According to the ÂNovaya GazetaÂ, most of the leadership of the Ichkerian
republic including Dokka Umarov (but not Aslan Maskhadov) was involved in the
business.

Obviously, the reason for the war of 1999 was not to Âfree the slavesÂ, but
first of all to Âpreserve integrity of the countryÂ. The reason for the war
of  1999 was certainly not the natural resources of the republic, as the
amount of oil and gas in Chechnya will never compensate the massive bill the
war has ccreated thus far. But one should also not ignore the fact that the
slave trade was one of the key factors in gaining the Russian public sympathy
for the war. Separatists traditionally blame the Russian special services for
provoking the conflicts between Chechnyan fractions and for their involvement
in slave trade, and there is some evidence to that. However, it is hard to
take seriously claims that Basayev was an FSB agent â similar to conspiracy
theories around 9/11, these theories totally deny the possibility that
Muslims themselves could form significant movements against imperialistic
ambitions.

The theories of Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, who was the most important Chechen
political scientist and writer, living abroad during Soviet times, regarding
the relatively anti-authoritarian historical Âwarrior democracy of Chechens
did not hold enough influence to direct the revolution in an
anti-authoritarian direction. No archaic anti-authoritarian social system can
survive, when surrounded by modern capitalism. There are no paths back to the
past. In the end, such attempts were hardly even made â in reality Dudayev
just wanted to be a small Yeltsin, just as Yeltsin wanted to be a big
Dudayev. The attack against the Chechen parliament  in 1992 was repeated by
Yeltsin in Moscow a year later. In June of 1993, Dudayev was already shooting
the city hall  in Grozny and meeting the opposition with tanks.

First of all, the example of the Chechen revolution is a good argument against
those Marxists (especially left communists), who believe that only the
material conditions and class composition of the movement defines its
destiny, that communism appears somewhat on its own if these factors fit. It
doesn't work like that â emancipation is impossible without
anti-authoritarian ideas spreading to the minds of the wider population.
Besides the material conditions, ideas are also necessary.  It is not an
issue of the Âbackwardness of Chechnya â as a matter of fact in Soviet
Chechnya industrial production was more developed than in plenty of other
republics. However in Soviet Chechnya,  the mostly Russian industrial
proletariat was in a privileged position compared to the mostly rural and
lumpen Chechen proletariat.

Obviously, there was nothing exceptionally horrible taking place in Chechnya
1991-1994, nothing that could justify the massacre that followed.
Post-colonial processes against former representatives of the privileged
stratum were much more brutal in the Algeria and Zanzibar of the 1960's. What
happened in Chechnya 1991-1994 is a good remainder for anarchists, that not
every revolution is an anarchist one, and it is not enough for the revolution
to be violent, not exclusively ethnic and that the lowest stratum of society
be involved. Besides the second and third characteristics, it is also
necessary that anti-authoritarian ideas be shared by a substantial part of
the people â otherwise it is likely that the story of the Chechen revolution
will be repeated. Bloody conflicts between the various fractions of the new
elite, and the unpunished banditry and slave trading whose victims are often
from ethnic minorities (in the Chechen case Terek Cossacks and other
Russians, Nogais and others), and at times even members of the Chechnyan
majority.
==================================================================
* This article was published in Avtonom #30 in December 2008,  whole issue is
available in PDF format  here: http://www.avtonom.org/node/1821. English
translation was originally published in Abolishing the Borders from Below #35.
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