A-Infos (en) Anarkismo.net: Coup in Honduras: the return of the gorillas or the tactics of attrition? by José Antonio Gutiérrez D.

Analysis of the events in Honduras and the dilemma of the oligarchy of Honduras in the 
face of an unsustainable coup: whether they cling to the strategy of the Gorillas 
(putschists in Latin American jargon) or they use the situation created by the coup in 
order to wear off the reformist Zelaya, in order to re-conquest the absolute hegemony in 
the political arena. The dilemma facing those who opposed the coup is also put forward: 
whether we allow the crisis to be solved in a top-down fashion, at the level of 
institutions, what would leave intact the roots of the problem, or we defeat the coup 
through mass mobilisation of the people, what not only would be a fatal blow for the 
oligarchy, but would also strengthen the Honduran working class as an important political 
actor in its own right.

The flashing sabers have once again shown their edge in Latin America: the coups d'etat 
and destabilization processes orchestrated from Washington have succeeded in countries 
where governments are implementing reform that may be uncomfortable for the digestion of 
the hemispheric elite-Venezuela 2002; Haiti 2004, Bolivia 2008. This time Honduras' turn 
has come, a country whose president Manuel Zelaya was overthrown by the military and 
exiled to Costa Rica. While Zelaya was kidnapped by soldiers in Congress a letter written 
by Zelaya was read (which turned out to be false) in which he renounced his position as 
president. At the same time, and while several MPs complained that the conduct of the 
president put at risk the "rule of law" and accused him of multiple violations of the 
Constitution real and imaginary, he was removed from office, which was assumed by the 
Congress president , Roberto Micheletti (who is also from Zelaya's Liberal Party).

The coup happened on the same day that a non-binding public consultation, called by Zelaya 
would have taken place regarding the need to change the Constitution, drafted in 1982, 
when the country was just emerging from an extremely brutal military dictatorship 
supported by U.S. who wielded power from 1972 to 1981. If the results were favorable to 
constitutional change a Constituent Assembly would be convened in November.

This proposal met fierce opposition from the most reactionary sectors of the Honduran 
oligarchy who control the legislature, the Supreme Court and the Army, and are gathered 
under the undisputed leadership of the ultra-conservative National Party of Honduras. 
These sectors are opposed to reforms that could produce minor questioning of their 
dominanation of Honduras. The judiciary, in coordination with its allies in the 
Legislature, were quick to declare the referndum unconstitutional on Thursday June 25, 
bringing about the scene for the coup . The tanks took to the streets Sunday, July 28, to 
the residence of Zelaya, and by this canceled the referendum and ended (or believed 
settled ), by force, the push and pull between the state powers [1].

What is the strategy behind the coup?


Honduras is a country that, as mentioned, is no stranger to our shared continental history 
of military dictatorships, which occupied the entire period from the 60s to 70s. In the 
80s this kind of history of violence and State terrorism continued under the form of a 
"democratic" regime under which proliferated under the paramilitaries, who killed 
thousands of peasants and workers from Honduras, and provided a platform for the Contra 
terrorism that devastated Nicaragua. These operations were directed by John Negroponte, 
U.S. ambassador in Honduras. The U.S. presence is still exists in the physical form of a 
U.S. military base with at least 500 U.S. troops on Honduran soil. Under this social and 
political dynamic there has been nurtured a strong network of domination that incorporates 
an absolute oligarchy and colonial army imbued with the doctrine of national security.

Zelaya is far from being a revolutionary. He is a member of the Liberal Party, in the past 
part of a reformist trend, a little more to the left than the bulk of his party, raising 
some social reforms (including the new constitution) . What most worries the Honduran 
oligarchy is the entry of Honduras into ALBA, an initiative of Latin American integration 
spearheaded by Venezuela. However, as we have mentioned on other occasions, the 
"radicalism" of a movement or a political leader cannot be measured in absolute terms, but 
must be understood in context: in this case, the "radicalism" of Zelaya does not emanate 
from its own policies, but from the absolute opposition to any compromise or change of any 
kind that is presented by the oligarchy. Not that Zelaya is seen as a "radical" because he 
is socialist, but rather because of the completely neaderthal character of the Honduran 
oligarchy. This paradox is what has made the fight for lukewarm reforms in Latin America 
often assume the forms of revolutionary struggle.

The coup strategy, which encompasses the paradox of opposing the reforms in the Latin 
American context, that is, forms of "counter-insurgency" in the absence of a revolutionary 
movement, can be summarized as follows: the necessity of stopping any process of social 
change, even the most tepid. The big problem for the oligarchy is that the time when a 
military dictatorship could be accepted without complications has passed. We are not in 
the'70 and the U.S. is more interested in keeping up the appearance of democracy and comes 
out with other methods to impose its will rather than through the shortcut of coups 
d'etat. Therefore the strategy of a coup has the main disadvantage to thes oligarchy of 
not being sustainable in the long term in the context of Honduras [2].

The complex post-coup scene

The putschists forces, like those who oppose them, have their internal contradictions. It 
is likely that there are elements that now fantasize about a return to the pure 
"gorillaism" that hit Latin America hard during the past four decades. But other elements 
must be well aware that it is highly unlikely that this coup adventure can continue for 
long. They know that after the earthquake of the coup in the Honduran political arena, you 
must have a plan B when it comes to re-establish constitutional order. For them, the coup 
would only be a deterrent within a broader strategy to regain control over political 
initiative and wear down their adversaries through attrition.

The coup as a masterful deterrent was applied in Haiti during the first government of the 
reformist priest Jean Bertrand Aristide. After being overthrown in September 1991 in a 
coup financed and supported by the CIA, Aristide took refuge in the U.S., where he began s 
a long period of negotiations with the U.S. authorities (the same that were behind the 
coup), and after a series of concessions, he was reinstalled in power three years later, 
with the help of 20,000 U.S. Marines who occupied Haiti and ended the Cedras dictatorship 
of [3]. During this period, the U.S. achieved "moderation" enough to allow that Aristide, 
at least momentarily, did not represent a "threat" [4]: "He was basically reduced to a 
defensive position, trying always to appear to the eyes of the U.S. Government as a 
reasonable person and as harmless as possible. Thus, he was increasingly submerged in a 
swamp of concessions and surrenders, leaving his people to expect that the solution came 
from his meetings and not an offensive in the streets and the mountains "[5]. When 
Aristide was restored to power, it came with a structural adjustment package to the 
Haitian economy that deepened the neoliberal model and with it the growing impoverishment 
of Haitian society.

It is likely that the coup through its strategy Honduran looks for something like the 
Haitian example (albeit in a rather shorter time line): gain time, wear out the"moderate" 
Zelaya (who in any case is a "radical") and seek international mediation to achieve an 
"agreement" between the parties that will finally exorcise the specter of social reforms 
of any significance. Whether or not the CIA is behind the coup (if not directly-or what is 
likely, indirectly as all putschist generals are heirs of the School of the Americas 
[6])(see other articles here from the SOAW-Molly), the U.S. does not have today, the 
ability to play the solo role of "softening" Zelaya. Furthermore, the current Latin 
American context does not allow it. Such a role would be left mainly to the OAS, but also 
to the larger international community: the EU and the USA.

Quickly the "international community" (including the UN [7]) has spoken out against the 
coup and rejected it and reiterated its support for Zelaya [8]. There has been 
particularly adamant rejection of teh coup among Latin American countries and the ALBA. 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez came out to say that his troops were on alert due to the 
aggression suffered by his ambassador to Honduras from putschists troops [9]. Obama held 
an ambiguous position, which may be understood as a way of exploring the field, asking 
"all political and social actors in Honduras to respect democratic norms, rule of law and 
the principles of the Inter-American Democratic Charter" [10], without rejecting or 
supporting the coup against Zelaya. Only after accusations by Chavez and the president of 
the UN General Assembly, Miguel D'Escoto, about the likely U.S. involvement in the coup, 
did the U.S. eventually recognize via an anonymous State Department official (more to save 
the face than otherwise) that Zelaya is the only legitimate president of Honduras [11]. 
Surely they do not think well of the diatribe by D'Escoto: "Many are wondering whether 
this attempted coup is part of the new policy [of the U.S. towards Latin America] since it 
is known that the Honduran army has a history of total submissiveness to the United 
States."[12]

Everything suggests that the oligarchs and the military can not maintain the coup and only 
see what they have achieved as a "political solution" that could in time take the form of 
a "compromise" on both sides, but leave standing its dominance in the medium term. That is 
the political role that the OAS can play, which, like most governments, have expressed 
their opposition to the coup not in concrete class terms, but from a defense of "rule of 
law. " Quitely, in this way, the lines are well marked for both sides: not accepting a 
"overflow" of the Constitution for either the right or left, or to be precise, an overflow 
is rejected by the right, precisely to avoid the spillover from the left. What is 
advocated is the "rule of law" that, ultimately, is what specifically capitalist social 
order is. This cross-bourgeois democracy can be led in a masterful way by the OEA, which, 
in the words of the director of Human Rights Watch, Jose Miguel Vivanco, "has a key role 
to play [to] quickly find a multilateral solution to this breakdown of democracy in 
Honduras" [13].

With this tactic, you are looking for a "multilateral" solution (with the coup mongers), 
by which the Honduran oligarchy will attempt to open a political space in institutional 
channels, which takes advantage of reformism, while destroying the political agenda of any 
major reform or any prospect of radicalization of the political process.

Down with the Coup! Strengthen Popular Mobilization!

The libertarians, along with all consistant revolutionaries position ourselves 
unequivocally on the side of the forces that oppose the coup. We can not allow the gorilla 
head to lift in any country in our region which has already suffered enough from 
dictatorships nor sit back and declare ourselves "neutral" even before the specter of a 
new one. But to put our position in a clear and categorical way.

The gorillas should be extirpated at its roots and we believe that this can not happen 
from above, from the bureaucratic point of the "international community", as claimed by 
sections of the bourgeoisie and reformism. The only one who can remove the root of the 
gorillas putschist are the people mobilized in the streets, in the fields, in workplaces, 
schools and universities to stop this military adventure. Within the post-coup scenario is 
the possibility that the people can become a player that definitely alters the balance of 
forces in Honduran society to achieve substantive changes. This people, overcoming fear, 
has begun to mobilize, from one hundred demonstrators outside the government palace in the 
morning to several thousand at this moment, and it starts to move en masse across the 
capital Tegucigalpa and other places inthe country.

Even when the protesters to call for little more than the defense of Zelaya, and with it, 
the defense of a rather lukewarm proposed reform it is in mobilizing that people learn to 
fight and learn to make their own project. Any mobilization contains the potential 
radicalization of the masses, especially when you consider that this protest was a 
spontaneous act of defiance to an oligarchy so stubborn and backward as to be criminal. On 
this mobilization depends the thwarting of the oligarchy's plan to deter "soften" the 
political project of Zelaya: on whether it will radicalize the masses and thus driving the 
process towards the left. This is the factor with which the oligarchy(nor reformism) does 
not count on . And this is the factor that weighs more in the balance.

On how this conflict is resolved will depend on the future of social change in Honduras. 
If the crisis is solved at the top, primarily via institutional channels [14], the result 
will be, undoubtedly, the commitment and cooperation of the parties with the consequent 
return to the status quo. If, however, the crisis, however, is solved from the bottom, and 
the coup is slowed primarily by mobilizing the people in the streets there is the 
possibility that the people will move towards a more radical end and achieve the crushing 
of the resistance of the oligarchy to change. Even when the outcome is far from the social 
revolution there will be a foundation for the people who undertake such a long path and 
leave a people that has gained in experience and confidence in their abilities. And that 
possibility will shake the oligarchy.

José Antonio Gutiérrez D.
June 28, 2009

Translation by Molly Mew


[1] On the controversial referendum to revise the following article 
http://criticadigital.com/impresa/index.php?secc=nota&n...26666
[2] The only country in America where this strategy has proven to be sustainable for a 
considerable period of time is Haiti. But Haiti is an absolutely unique event in the Latin 
American context, a country highly dependent, impoverished, and delayed the oligarchy 
certainly more cave throughout the hemisphere. But even in Haiti, the imperialists have 
had a democratic facade to sustain the coup (a subsidiary of the UN force, MINUSTAH, and 
the role of a president elected "democratically," Preval). For more details on this review 
process http://www.anarkismo.net/article/1063
http://www.anarkismo.net/article/2078
http://www.anarkismo.net/article/2698
http://www.anarkismo.net/article/4651
[3] For more details on this process reviewed, from a social perspective, the book by Alex 
Dupuy "Haiti in the New World Order, Westview Press, 1997, pp.140-166. You can also 
review, from a revolutionary perspective, "The Unmaking of a President" Kim Ives, "The 
Haiti-Files" (ed. James Ridgeway), Essential Books, 1994, pp.87-103.
[4] At least momentarily, because then again in 2004, Bush again Arisitde considered 
persona non grata and was overthrown in another coup d'etat.
[5] Kim Ives, op. cit., p.95
[6] In any case, the U.S. government has admitted being in contact very recently with the 
army of Honduras in connection with the "crisis" http://espanol.news.yahoo.com/s/28062009/ 
54/n-latam-ee-....html
[7] http://espanol.news.yahoo.com/s/ap/090628/latinoamerica...ras_2
[8] http://espanol.news.yahoo.com/s/reuters/090628/titulare...nes_1
[9] Also, the ambassadors of Cuba and Nicaragua were attacked. 
http://espanol.news.yahoo.com/s/reuters/090629/latinoam...ras_6
[10] http://espanol.news.yahoo.com/s/ap/090628/latinoamerica...iones
[11] http://espanol.news.yahoo.com/s/reuters/090628/latinoam...aya_1
[12] http://espanol.news.yahoo.com/s/28062009/54/n-latam-ee-....html
[13] http://espanol.news.yahoo.com/s/28062009/54/n-latam-ee-....html By the way, the role 
of containment is being sought in the OAS, is the same as the UNASUR played as in the 
Bolivian crisis of late 2008, when it condemned the slaughter of Pando, but stressed that 
the decision was from the perspective of "defending the rule of law," looking at the same 
time to disband the people.
[14] I say "primarily" because there is no one single factor to resolve the crisis: 
institutional action (the international community, for example), nor action popular with 
the factors (those that are popular on the street). Neither tactic can be excluded, all 
are necessary, but the reformist strategy prioritizes the institutional factor (on the 
ground which gives the advantage to the oligarchy), while the revolutionary strategy must 
factor favoring the popular (but not excluding pressure on the institutional ).
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