A - I n f o s
a multi-lingual news service by, for, and about anarchists
News in all languages
Last 30 posts (Homepage)
archives of old posts
The last 100 posts, according
The First Few Lines of The Last 10 posts in:
First few lines of all posts of last 24 hours
Links to indexes of first few lines of all posts
of past 30 days |
of 2002 |
of 2003 |
of 2004 |
of 2005 |
of 2006 |
of 2007 |
of 2008 |
of 2009 |
of 2010 |
of 2011 |
of 2012 |
of 2013 |
of 2014 |
of 2015 |
of 2016 |
of 2017 |
Syndication Of A-Infos - including
RDF - How to Syndicate A-Infos
Subscribe to the a-infos newsgroups
(en) anarkismo.net: Some ideas to understand fujimorismo by Cusco Libertario - ALB (ca, it) [machine translation]
Mon, 1 Jan 2018 12:34:45 +0200
The party of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, current president of Peru has no majority in Congress.
It has passed a motion of censure, promoted by the Fujimorist Popular Force party,
precisely with votes from deputies of that opposition force. Soon after, he declared a
pardon for Alberto Fujimori, imprisoned for crimes against humanity. Tens of thousands of
people have taken to the streets to the cry of The indult is an insult! and demanding the
resignation of all the corrupt. Two of his ministers have also resigned for the time
being. ---- In this article from Cuzco Libertario Fujimorismo is explained as right-wing
populism and how it can continue to count so strongly today. ALB ---- What makes a
questionable character still have support? Is Fujimorism a postmodern neoliberal
messianism? How to defeat a movement that is not based on rational arguments?
The Fujimori myth
All versions of what happened in the last decade of the twentieth century coincide in
pointing to a historical figure, for better or for worse, called Fujimori. Some thank him
for his "successes in economic policies" and have defeated terrorism. Others condemn their
corruption and their repressive and authoritarian policy. But all continue to point out
virtues and defects as belonging to the individual, as if another president had been in
his place, he would not have had the same merits and defects.
The truth is that everything Fujimori did would have been done by anyone who was in his
place. To begin with, he applied Vargas Llosa's economic program, shok included, which is
why many supporters and advisers to the novelist ended up joining Fujimorismo. The
Machiavellian advisor Vladimiro Montesinos was going to present himself to anyone, of
course the "Chinese" was ideal, but looking into the distance, would not other candidates
have succumbed to the presence of this individual trained by the CIA?
The defeat of terrorism was not even used in campaign by Fujimori himself, I clearly
remember that he was talking about combating the recession to take away the basis of
Sendero. The truth is that Sendero never reached the "strategic equilibrium" he
proclaimed, he was defeated by the rounds in the countryside and with widespread rejection
of popular organizations in the cities. His attacks of those years were only his drowned
manotazos. The same policemen who fought against this in the 80s, would be those who would
finally capture Gonzalo, a fact in which nothing had to do with the Chinese and less his
It happens that in the year 90, the population was desperate because of the economic
crisis, Vargas Llosa offered neoliberalism as the only solution and the left suffered the
effects of the world crisis of Marxism. Then a stranger appears who can grow in the polls.
It is naive to think that the powers that be have not found out the past of such a "dark"
character. His work and political background was enough to realize that he would be a
useful ruler and easily manipulated by the powerful groups. These allowed the people to be
hopeful with this "savior" and believed that he had defeated neoliberalism. Illusion that
ended with the fujishok a month after taking office, however, Fujimorist support grew
instead of decreasing.
It is interesting to compare what happened with Ollanta 16 years later, when, like El
Chino, he did not fulfill his promise (Conga case). But this time he quickly lost his
popular support. The years explain this difference in part (the disappointment was greater
in a known script), and there is an additional factor:
Fujimorism is "the other Path"
One of the characteristics highlighted in the campaign of the 90 was that Fujimori was
"chinito". His ethnicity weighed a lot on the people and was skillfully used by the
candidate and more when it was already government. His companions were multi-ethnic, for
the first time there was a congress full of brown faces and a Quechua-speaking
vice-president. However, after the autogolpe of 1992, the vice president wanted to lead
the democratic opposition by speaking in Quechua. The facts show that the Andean identity
was not what weighed on the "cholos" of that time.
Fujimori had an origin and a discourse that was based on what came to be called "chicha
culture". The subject of humble origin who came to triumph in the world of whites, as
thousands of merchants, itinerant and migrants, had been searching. Succeed in the modern
world, not change society or make it more just, only get a place of that "promise of
Peruvian life", although to get it would have to commit abuses.
Fujimori dissolved the Congress and centralized power in his person, implementing a model
that would be recurrent 20 years later: soft coups, dictatorships headed by civilians. The
political parties opposed the measure, joining in this right and left. But the effect
achieved was contrary, the population saw in them the union of all the guilty of the
malaise of the country, and inclined them rather to support the dictatorship.
Then, with an improvised government that had the only doctrine to favor business,
corruption was uncovered at levels never before seen. And it was this that ended up
weakening the regime, its late years harassed by student protest and burying itself with
its own authoritarian excesses. The re-reelection, the march of the 4 of them and the
vladivideos liquidated a regime that only a year ago seemed very strengthened.
However, a large part of their social bases remained Fujimorist and are those that now
support their return. This can not be explained only by the clientelism and the symbolic
management that the Chinese had. His bases continued to be reflected in this leader who
did not come from a political tradition but from a life experience similar to his, he was
a "successful entrepreneur" to use contemporary terms.
From the 90s, serious politicians and quite ideological, were replaced by politicians
with characteristics of TV or film actors: people in which the public (the voters) are
subliminally reflected, rejoicing in their triumphs as well as rejoicing in the triumph of
a football team or the success of the beau of the novel. In both cases, these joys will
not change the life of the viewer, but he feels a symbolic satisfaction that helps him to
spend the empty and alienated life he has left. Nor does he dislike that his "heroes" win
grossly high figures. Neoliberalism only brought these modes of spectacle to politics.
Similarities and differences of Fujimorism and other neoliberalisms
In Argentina, neoliberalism was implemented by Carlos Menem, an authoritarian and corrupt
leader who ruled all 90 (he also became a friend of Fujimori), later tried and convicted
of corruption. In Brazil he was initiated by Collor de Melo, who resigned due to
corruption scandals. In Mexico was Carlos Salinas, whose brother Raúl was convicted of
corruption at the end of his brother's term. As we see, corruption and authoritarianism
were a constant in the neoliberal rulers of the decade. The difference is that no one
built a social base capable of returning 20 years later, perhaps this is due to the
authoritarian tradition more present in Peru than in those countries.
Most of Latin America had returned to democracy in the 1980s, but only in Peru did an
unprecedented civil war break out. This explains why the fear of the return of terrorism
is stronger than the fear of losing democracy. The Peruvian case is more similar to the
Central American case, but in these countries, the guerrillas negotiated peace with the
neoliberal governments. These guerrillas had been well seen by a good sector of their
countries, unlike Sendero, which was not only questioned by the Peruvian left, but had
also been criminally confronted. Furthermore, the absence of a "strategic balance" meant
that there was no possible negotiation and Fujimori took care to build his image as the
winner of terrorism, fomenting the fear of Sendero in the population. The war had ended in
1993, but the repression justified the possible return of Sendero, a policy that is
applied until today.
The same Chinese authoritarian model was applied by other governments in the following
decade, but to counter neoliberalism. The case of Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in
Bolivia are symptomatic, they constructed messianic caudillismos stirring the fear of the
return of neoliberalism. Although neoliberalism was never really abandoned, it did
encourage the inclusion of large marginalized sectors of their countries, the case of the
indigenous Bolivians is the most interesting. That is to say, the progressives did what
Fujimori only preached but never fulfilled. And even then, it still has popular support.
Similarities and differences of the dictatorship and democracy
The fall of the fujimorato was a half-hearted victory, since the Constitution of 93 and
the entire structure of the neoliberal state were maintained. The local politics were
filled with small Fujimoris: authoritarian and corrupt leaders, who in some cases aspired
to the presidency. This way of doing politics went on until the present and the Odebrecht
case is just one example.
As for repression, more violence we have seen in democratic governments like Alan Garcia's
second, than in the worst years of the dictatorship. Moreover, if we review the CVR
report, we note that there were more violations of human rights in the government of
Belaúnde than in Fujimori's, and that these events occur in a context of war, thus, these
crimes are given to large scale at the beginning of the fujimorato, decreasing later.
What yes, the fujimorismo used the fear to the terrorism to repress any protest, arriving
at selective assassinations that also weakened its image. These policies were modified
only in part and thanks to the pressure of civil society, but it continues to be applied
in social conflicts. In areas affected by megaprojects and extractive companies, there is
no difference between the dictatorship and the current supposed democracy.
Another interesting aspect is the cultural one. It has prolonged the "chicha culture" that
Fujimori took advantage of, the entrepreneurs continue to choose leaders in whom they are
reflected even though there is no real link, they are content with works or with gifts,
under the idea that all politicians are corrupt and therefore I prefer to choose a known
one. There, a Fujimori is still the best option.
The prison of Fujimori increased this symbolic link of his followers, who expressed that
the poor "chinito" is imprisoned despite doing good deeds, this is similar to defending
the soccer player or gallant of the novel who may have committed crimes, but He forgives
him for the "illusions and joys" that he made us live. The politics turned into spectacle
is not exclusive of Peru, it occurred at the same time that the cultural level was
intentionally lowered in all countries, it is a neoliberal policy.
Each generation has its fight
The generation that rebelled against the fujimorato actually did it against the system, in
its own way and with the most affordable speech at the time: the recovery of democracy.
Many of the youth then were involved in subsequent neoliberal governments, justifying that
their struggle had been against an autocratic and corrupt regime with its own name,
Making a comparison between that youthful rebellion and the one against the Pulpín Law,
there are apparent similarities but more differences. The "pulpines" rebelled against a
specific law, with speeches more anti-system than their predecessors. They built an
unprecedented experience in the country, the zones, which have been seen in other
countries in recent decades but here seemed impossible. However, the pulpín spirit was
largely absorbed by the antifujimorismo that prevented the election of Keiko Fujimori in 2016.
It is curious that a large part of the antifujimoristas are young people who did not live
directly during the time of the fujimorato. But they know the fear that generated that
period and avoid its possible return makes accept any government, as did the progressives
in Brazil or Bolivia, presenting itself as the only option to avoid the neoliberal return.
This fear competes with another greater and more pernicious, the fear of the return of
terrorism, fear that favors the neoliberals in general, but more Fujimorism in particular,
based on the idea that it was the Chinese who alone could defeat that threat .
In this scenario, confronting corruption with honesty to defeat the Fujimorismo does not
work, because the population considers that all politicians are corrupt. Nor does the
dichotomy democracy-dictatorship help, because in most of the inhabitants that dichotomy
is invisible. Thus, the power of Fujimorismo is not in its actions or in its money but in
its social bases and that is where democratic and left should work. Bases that seek strong
leaders of "non-white" origins, that's why at the time Toledo was able to compete with
Fujimori, although later his caudillismo was quickly emptied, as also happened to Humala.
Other examples of these "possible rivals" are Antauro Humala or Goyo Santos.
But replacing one caudillo with another would only have a symbolic value, it would be
Fujimori without Fujimori (something that Toledo promised in the 1990s). The issue is how
we carry the teachings of the Zones and many others, to those neighborhoods beset by
remnants of Path on the one hand, and Fujimorism today on the other. How we change the
"progressive" paradigm, the search for personal success, to aspire that "chicha"
modernity, for a more communitarian and libertarian paradigm. The fight is in the concrete
experiences that we can build as alternatives to neoliberalism and its corruption.
A - I N F O S N E W S S E R V I C E
By, For, and About Anarchists
Send news reports to A-infos-en mailing list
A-Infos Information Center