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(en) anarkismo.net: Some ideas to understand fujimorismo by Cusco Libertario - ALB (ca, it) [machine translation]

Date Mon, 1 Jan 2018 12:34:45 +0200

The party of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, current president of Peru has no majority in Congress. It has passed a motion of censure, promoted by the Fujimorist Popular Force party, precisely with votes from deputies of that opposition force. Soon after, he declared a pardon for Alberto Fujimori, imprisoned for crimes against humanity. Tens of thousands of people have taken to the streets to the cry of The indult is an insult! and demanding the resignation of all the corrupt. Two of his ministers have also resigned for the time being. ---- In this article from Cuzco Libertario Fujimorismo is explained as right-wing populism and how it can continue to count so strongly today. ALB ---- What makes a questionable character still have support? Is Fujimorism a postmodern neoliberal messianism? How to defeat a movement that is not based on rational arguments?

The Fujimori myth

All versions of what happened in the last decade of the twentieth century coincide in pointing to a historical figure, for better or for worse, called Fujimori. Some thank him for his "successes in economic policies" and have defeated terrorism. Others condemn their corruption and their repressive and authoritarian policy. But all continue to point out virtues and defects as belonging to the individual, as if another president had been in his place, he would not have had the same merits and defects.

The truth is that everything Fujimori did would have been done by anyone who was in his place. To begin with, he applied Vargas Llosa's economic program, shok included, which is why many supporters and advisers to the novelist ended up joining Fujimorismo. The Machiavellian advisor Vladimiro Montesinos was going to present himself to anyone, of course the "Chinese" was ideal, but looking into the distance, would not other candidates have succumbed to the presence of this individual trained by the CIA?

The defeat of terrorism was not even used in campaign by Fujimori himself, I clearly remember that he was talking about combating the recession to take away the basis of Sendero. The truth is that Sendero never reached the "strategic equilibrium" he proclaimed, he was defeated by the rounds in the countryside and with widespread rejection of popular organizations in the cities. His attacks of those years were only his drowned manotazos. The same policemen who fought against this in the 80s, would be those who would finally capture Gonzalo, a fact in which nothing had to do with the Chinese and less his adviser.

It happens that in the year 90, the population was desperate because of the economic crisis, Vargas Llosa offered neoliberalism as the only solution and the left suffered the effects of the world crisis of Marxism. Then a stranger appears who can grow in the polls. It is naive to think that the powers that be have not found out the past of such a "dark" character. His work and political background was enough to realize that he would be a useful ruler and easily manipulated by the powerful groups. These allowed the people to be hopeful with this "savior" and believed that he had defeated neoliberalism. Illusion that ended with the fujishok a month after taking office, however, Fujimorist support grew instead of decreasing.

It is interesting to compare what happened with Ollanta 16 years later, when, like El Chino, he did not fulfill his promise (Conga case). But this time he quickly lost his popular support. The years explain this difference in part (the disappointment was greater in a known script), and there is an additional factor:

Fujimorism is "the other Path"

One of the characteristics highlighted in the campaign of the 90 was that Fujimori was "chinito". His ethnicity weighed a lot on the people and was skillfully used by the candidate and more when it was already government. His companions were multi-ethnic, for the first time there was a congress full of brown faces and a Quechua-speaking vice-president. However, after the autogolpe of 1992, the vice president wanted to lead the democratic opposition by speaking in Quechua. The facts show that the Andean identity was not what weighed on the "cholos" of that time.

Fujimori had an origin and a discourse that was based on what came to be called "chicha culture". The subject of humble origin who came to triumph in the world of whites, as thousands of merchants, itinerant and migrants, had been searching. Succeed in the modern world, not change society or make it more just, only get a place of that "promise of Peruvian life", although to get it would have to commit abuses.

Fujimori dissolved the Congress and centralized power in his person, implementing a model that would be recurrent 20 years later: soft coups, dictatorships headed by civilians. The political parties opposed the measure, joining in this right and left. But the effect achieved was contrary, the population saw in them the union of all the guilty of the malaise of the country, and inclined them rather to support the dictatorship.

Then, with an improvised government that had the only doctrine to favor business, corruption was uncovered at levels never before seen. And it was this that ended up weakening the regime, its late years harassed by student protest and burying itself with its own authoritarian excesses. The re-reelection, the march of the 4 of them and the vladivideos liquidated a regime that only a year ago seemed very strengthened.

However, a large part of their social bases remained Fujimorist and are those that now support their return. This can not be explained only by the clientelism and the symbolic management that the Chinese had. His bases continued to be reflected in this leader who did not come from a political tradition but from a life experience similar to his, he was a "successful entrepreneur" to use contemporary terms.

From the 90s, serious politicians and quite ideological, were replaced by politicians with characteristics of TV or film actors: people in which the public (the voters) are subliminally reflected, rejoicing in their triumphs as well as rejoicing in the triumph of a football team or the success of the beau of the novel. In both cases, these joys will not change the life of the viewer, but he feels a symbolic satisfaction that helps him to spend the empty and alienated life he has left. Nor does he dislike that his "heroes" win grossly high figures. Neoliberalism only brought these modes of spectacle to politics.

Similarities and differences of Fujimorism and other neoliberalisms

In Argentina, neoliberalism was implemented by Carlos Menem, an authoritarian and corrupt leader who ruled all 90 (he also became a friend of Fujimori), later tried and convicted of corruption. In Brazil he was initiated by Collor de Melo, who resigned due to corruption scandals. In Mexico was Carlos Salinas, whose brother Raúl was convicted of corruption at the end of his brother's term. As we see, corruption and authoritarianism were a constant in the neoliberal rulers of the decade. The difference is that no one built a social base capable of returning 20 years later, perhaps this is due to the authoritarian tradition more present in Peru than in those countries.

Most of Latin America had returned to democracy in the 1980s, but only in Peru did an unprecedented civil war break out. This explains why the fear of the return of terrorism is stronger than the fear of losing democracy. The Peruvian case is more similar to the Central American case, but in these countries, the guerrillas negotiated peace with the neoliberal governments. These guerrillas had been well seen by a good sector of their countries, unlike Sendero, which was not only questioned by the Peruvian left, but had also been criminally confronted. Furthermore, the absence of a "strategic balance" meant that there was no possible negotiation and Fujimori took care to build his image as the winner of terrorism, fomenting the fear of Sendero in the population. The war had ended in 1993, but the repression justified the possible return of Sendero, a policy that is applied until today.

The same Chinese authoritarian model was applied by other governments in the following decade, but to counter neoliberalism. The case of Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia are symptomatic, they constructed messianic caudillismos stirring the fear of the return of neoliberalism. Although neoliberalism was never really abandoned, it did encourage the inclusion of large marginalized sectors of their countries, the case of the indigenous Bolivians is the most interesting. That is to say, the progressives did what Fujimori only preached but never fulfilled. And even then, it still has popular support.

Similarities and differences of the dictatorship and democracy

The fall of the fujimorato was a half-hearted victory, since the Constitution of 93 and the entire structure of the neoliberal state were maintained. The local politics were filled with small Fujimoris: authoritarian and corrupt leaders, who in some cases aspired to the presidency. This way of doing politics went on until the present and the Odebrecht case is just one example.

As for repression, more violence we have seen in democratic governments like Alan Garcia's second, than in the worst years of the dictatorship. Moreover, if we review the CVR report, we note that there were more violations of human rights in the government of Belaúnde than in Fujimori's, and that these events occur in a context of war, thus, these crimes are given to large scale at the beginning of the fujimorato, decreasing later.

What yes, the fujimorismo used the fear to the terrorism to repress any protest, arriving at selective assassinations that also weakened its image. These policies were modified only in part and thanks to the pressure of civil society, but it continues to be applied in social conflicts. In areas affected by megaprojects and extractive companies, there is no difference between the dictatorship and the current supposed democracy.

Another interesting aspect is the cultural one. It has prolonged the "chicha culture" that Fujimori took advantage of, the entrepreneurs continue to choose leaders in whom they are reflected even though there is no real link, they are content with works or with gifts, under the idea that all politicians are corrupt and therefore I prefer to choose a known one. There, a Fujimori is still the best option.

The prison of Fujimori increased this symbolic link of his followers, who expressed that the poor "chinito" is imprisoned despite doing good deeds, this is similar to defending the soccer player or gallant of the novel who may have committed crimes, but He forgives him for the "illusions and joys" that he made us live. The politics turned into spectacle is not exclusive of Peru, it occurred at the same time that the cultural level was intentionally lowered in all countries, it is a neoliberal policy.

Each generation has its fight

The generation that rebelled against the fujimorato actually did it against the system, in its own way and with the most affordable speech at the time: the recovery of democracy. Many of the youth then were involved in subsequent neoliberal governments, justifying that their struggle had been against an autocratic and corrupt regime with its own name, Fujimorismo.

Making a comparison between that youthful rebellion and the one against the Pulpín Law, there are apparent similarities but more differences. The "pulpines" rebelled against a specific law, with speeches more anti-system than their predecessors. They built an unprecedented experience in the country, the zones, which have been seen in other countries in recent decades but here seemed impossible. However, the pulpín spirit was largely absorbed by the antifujimorismo that prevented the election of Keiko Fujimori in 2016.

It is curious that a large part of the antifujimoristas are young people who did not live directly during the time of the fujimorato. But they know the fear that generated that period and avoid its possible return makes accept any government, as did the progressives in Brazil or Bolivia, presenting itself as the only option to avoid the neoliberal return. This fear competes with another greater and more pernicious, the fear of the return of terrorism, fear that favors the neoliberals in general, but more Fujimorism in particular, based on the idea that it was the Chinese who alone could defeat that threat .

In this scenario, confronting corruption with honesty to defeat the Fujimorismo does not work, because the population considers that all politicians are corrupt. Nor does the dichotomy democracy-dictatorship help, because in most of the inhabitants that dichotomy is invisible. Thus, the power of Fujimorismo is not in its actions or in its money but in its social bases and that is where democratic and left should work. Bases that seek strong leaders of "non-white" origins, that's why at the time Toledo was able to compete with Fujimori, although later his caudillismo was quickly emptied, as also happened to Humala. Other examples of these "possible rivals" are Antauro Humala or Goyo Santos.

But replacing one caudillo with another would only have a symbolic value, it would be Fujimori without Fujimori (something that Toledo promised in the 1990s). The issue is how we carry the teachings of the Zones and many others, to those neighborhoods beset by remnants of Path on the one hand, and Fujimorism today on the other. How we change the "progressive" paradigm, the search for personal success, to aspire that "chicha" modernity, for a more communitarian and libertarian paradigm. The fight is in the concrete experiences that we can build as alternatives to neoliberalism and its corruption.

Related Link:http://anarcochero.blogspot.com.es/2017/12/algunas-ideas-para-entender-al.html

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