A-Infos (en) Southern African, Journal of Southern African Revolutionary Anarchism #8 - Asgisa: A Working Class Critique by Lucien van der Walt

The announcement of the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative ­ South Africa 
(Asgisa) in 2006 has been met with some enthusiasm in left and labour circles. 
There is, however, very little to be excited about. ---- The SA Communist Party 
(SACP) praised the Asgisa programme soon after its launch. Blade Nzimande 
admitted that Asgisa was not a new macro-economic policy, and that it ignored 
"logistics" relevant to the working class, like decent transport and education. 
1 Even so, he was "broadly" upbeat, claiming to see signs of a shift towards "an 
active developmental state ... a comprehensive industrial policy and ... 
integrated local development planning", a "welcome shift." All reasonable
people, he added, "agree with the relevance" of promoting a competitive national
economy.

   Cosatu was more openly critical, criticis-
ing Asgisa at its September 2006 congress.
The union federation went on to argue for
its usual social democratic and nationalist
project: expand the State sector, promote
export-led manufacturing growth, and (in
line with Keynesian thinking) 2 redistribute
income to the poor in order to boost local
demand and, so, economic growth. Still,
Cosatu reaffirmed its support for the ANC ­
or, more, specifically, for disgraced ANC
leader Jacob Zuma, who many naively
believe will implement a pro-labour pro-
gramme.

WHAT IS ASGISA?

   The differences between the SACP and
Cosatu are not that deep. Both currently
embrace the notion of a "developmental
state", which they take to mean an inter-
ventionist State machine that can actively
shape the capitalist economy ­ hopefully in
the interests of the masses.
   The "developmental state" is, in this con-
text, really a restatement of Cosatu and the
SACP's long-standing support for a
"national democratic" interventionist State
that would supposedly help provide the
basis for a future transition to socialism.
This is in line with the Marxist two-stage
theory that the immediate task is a "nation-
al democratic revolution" (NDR), meaning
a mixed capitalist economy in which the
"national question" is resolved before
socialism becomes possible.
   The term "developmental state" was orig-
inally coined to refer to ruthless but efficient
capitalist dictatorships in East Asia like
South Korea, which succeeded ­ despite a
colonial legacy ­ in becoming significant
industrial capitalist powers. Since then the
term has mutated, and has become widely
used by the State-centred left to describe
just about any alternative to neo-liberalism.
Even the ANC government (which avoids
the term "neo-liberal" like poison, while
applying neo-liberalism in practice) now
calls itself a "developmental state".
   The difference between the SACP and
Cosatu on Asgisa is, in other words, that
the SACP sees Asgisa as a move from
neo-liberalism to the "developmental state";
Cosatu does not. So, is Asgisa a break
with the neo-liberal framework laid out ten
years ago in Gear? And, second, will
Asgisa help meet the needs of the broad
working class?

THE GENERAL PROGRAMME

   Like Gear, Asgisa starts by stating that it
aims to create jobs, halve unemployment,
and reach sustained economic growth
(around 6% annually by 2010). 3 But since
job creation and reducing poverty are the
supposed goals of just about any econom-
ic policy, we can't evaluate Asgisa on the
basis of its intensions. As with Gear, the
crucial issue is how will these goals be
reached? And it is here that the problems
start.
   As Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-
Ngcuka (closely identified with Asgisa) has
stated, 4 it is not a replacement for Gear. It
is a package of specific, short-term initia-
tives to take the restructuring of the South
African economy forward by removing
"binding constraints" and identifying
"growth points."
   The country's current economic trajectory
is praised in Asgisa as showing "steady
improvement" in improving living condi-
tions, creating jobs, promoting growth, and
improving business confidence (pp. 2-3). A
dishonest representation of the data lets
Asgisa make manifestly ridiculous claims
that the real incomes of the poor have
increased sharply since 1994 (!), and that
540,000 net new jobs were created in
2004-2005 alone (!!).
   The "binding constraints" include a cur-
rency that is "overvalued" (making exports
uncompetitive), poor infrastructure that
hampers efficiency (particularly in trans-
port), skills shortages, a high price of
labour due to transport costs, lack of com-
petition and opportunities for new busi-
nesses, a "sub-optimal regulatory environ-
ment" (in labour law and other areas), and
a lack of State capacity (pp. 4-6). There is
nothing in this stress on competition,
export-led growth, cutting costs for busi-
ness, and developing an efficient State,
that departs in the least from neo-liberal-
ism.

"DECISIVE INTERVENTIONS"

   Asgisa's "decisive interventions" (not "a
shift in economic policy") (p. 6) to deal with
these issues are generally also within the
neo-liberal framework, except when they
involve "Black Economic Empowerment"
(BEE) measures. BEE does contradict
neo-liberalism to the extent that black cap-
italists are given special treatment; howev-
er, BEE and neo-liberalism can also be
partly reconciled by using neo-liberal
measures like privatisation (the transfer of
state operations and assets to the private
sector) and outsourcing to BEE compa-
nies.
   Asgisa's "decisive interventions" include
sector strategies (mainly promoting
tourism, and attracting outsourced jobs
from other countries), a set of fairly unco-
ordinated plans to promote skills (with the
emphasis on skills for a competitive econo-
my), promoting small businesses (with an
emphasis on BEE through privatisation,
cheap loans, and a "review" of tax and
labour laws), suitable macro-economic
policies (mainly continuing Gear's stress
on a weak rand, low inflation, and spending
less money more efficiently), and "gover-
nance" issues (more efficiency, and contin-
uing to move towards a "social contract" on
"economic matters") (pp. 8-16).
   Perhaps the most important part of Asgisa
is a heavy stress on promoting infrastruc-
ture. Admitting that a large backlog in infra-
structure developed in the first decade of
Gear, Asgisa envisages real and significant
increases in investment spending, growing
at perhaps 10-15 percent per year, and
leading off with R370 billion being spent
from October 2005 to March 2008. Around
half of this will be done via the corporatised
(and partially commercialised) State corpo-
rations, Eskom (electricity) and Transnet
(transport) (pp. 6-8). This supposedly (but
not really) 5 "unprecedented" rise in expen-
diture will contribute to the 2010 World Cup
initiative, promote "public-private partner-
ships" (PPPs, a type of privatisation) in
infrastructure, and also contribute to the
various Industrial Development Zones that
are designed to promote exports and
attract direct investment.

A HIGHER GEAR?

   While Asgisa is, as should be expected,
far more concrete than Gear in setting out
precise objectives and initiatives, there is
nothing here that breaks with Gear.
Asgisa's "decisive interventions" are either
directly in line with Gear's approach (such
as the stress on outsourcing), or are direct
restatements of Gear's policies (inflation
targeting, fiscal discipline, the "social con-
tract", more flexible labour laws).
   And - this is especially important to stress
- the emphasis on infrastructure develop-
ment in Asgisa is entirely consistent with
Gear's call for "a substantial acceleration in
government investment spending, together
with improved maintenance and operation
of public assets," up to, and including, the
use of PPPs. 6 This aspect of Gear was
almost totally neglected in the past, with
the result that infrastructure has crumbled.
Even the dullest bureaucrats, it seems,
have come to realise that
rolling electricity blackouts,
courtesy of Eskom, and an
overworked and unreliable
railway grid, courtesy of
Transnet are disastrous to
efficient capitalist accumu-
lation.

BEE IN THE NEO-LIBERAL ERA

   The only real break is,
perhaps, the heavy stress 

on BEE. Gear itself said
almost nothing about the
apartheid-derived context.
Gear emphasised promot-
ing small and medium
enterprises (p. 13), but did
not link this specifically to
BEE. Given that the ANC is
a bourgeois nationalist party, Asgisa's
stress on BEE is not surprising.
   As a capitalist party, at the helm of a cap-
italist State, the ANC must adapt the new
order of neo-liberalism. As an African
nationalist party, built in the anti-apartheid
struggle, the ANC must also promote the
development of the African elite: it has
done this in the State machinery quite
quickly and effectively, but has made quite
limited inroads into the private sector. This
somewhat contradictory agenda lies at the
heart of ANC policy. Neither side of the
contradiction, however, offers the working
class anything.

NEO-LIBERAL CLASS WAR

    If by "developmental state", we mean a
break with neo-liberalism, it is mere wishful
thinking to see Asgisa representing a shift
towards "an active developmental state." It
is an elaboration of the Gear project. Only
a highly abstract analysis, where neo-liber-
alism is viewed in the most purist terms,
could deny Asgisa's neo-liberal credentials.
    With Asgisa firmly part of the neo-liberal
agenda, it follows that it offers nothing pos-
itive to the working class. As we have
argued before, neo-liberalism is about
restructuring capitalism in a period of long-
term decline to restore profitability, and
shift the balance of class forces decisively
in favour of the ruling class. This involves
a whole series of measures against the
working class: flexibility, cost recovery,
wage freezes, cuts in welfare and public
transport, an ideological offensive against
unions, and so on.
    Neo-liberalism succeeds in its objectives
to the extent that capitalist economic
growth is restored, and to the extent that
working class conditions and power are
eroded. On both counts, Gear is a "suc-
cess". That the South African economy is
growing at its fastest since the 1970s at the
exact same time as poverty, unemploy-
ment and de-unionisation accelerate is not
accidental ­ it is the necessary outcome of
neo-liberalism.
    That Asgisa will continue the pattern is
quite clear, once we examine its class char-
acter. For example, hundreds of billions
will be spent on infrastructure, but the
emphasis is on meeting "rapidly growing
demand", and providing "spin-offs" for
"business development and empower-
ment" (p. 7), rather than cheap, reliable
and safe public transport; roads will be
developed through a so-called "Extended
Public Works Programme", which will cen-
tre on short-term jobs and outsourcing to
(black) sub-contractors (p. 14).

AND NOW?
   The fact of the matter is that capitalism, in
general, is based upon the systematic
domination, exploitation, and exclusion of
the working class. The slums are not the
consequence of isolation from the "eco-
nomic mainstream," but its creation. BEE
does not marginalise the working class by
accident, but because all capitalists - and
the larger ruling class as well ­ inevitably
and necessarily marginalise the working
class, of whatever race or nationality.
   In the era of neo-liberalism, these prob-
lems are particularly marked, for neo-liber-
alism involves a systematic redistribution of
wealth and power away from the working
class. To assume that neo-liberalism can
be halted by "engaging" the ANC ­ let
alone, by electing a political opportunist
facing corruption charges like Zuma ­ is
extremely naïve.
   "Social equity" requires a significant
redistribution of wealth and power towards
the working class, and this requires, in turn,
large-scale struggle. Only partial gains are
possible within the current social order;
substantial change requires a new order of
things. The task of the hour is not to place
false hope in the policies of the ruling class,
nor yet to choose which member of the rul-
ing class assumes the pres-
idential throne. The task is
to start winning people to
the vision of a world beyond
capitalism, based on partic-
ipatory planning, distribu-
tion by need, international-
ism and self-management.
NOTES:
1. Blade Nzimande, 11 April
2006, "Asgisa's devil lies in the
detail," Business Times
2. J. M. Keynes argued that
higher working class incomes
were good for capitalist busi-
ness
3. The Presidency, 2006,
Accelerated and Shared
Growth Initiative ­ South Africa
(a summary), Republic of South Africa, pp 2-3.
All subsequent Asgisa references are to this
document: the closest to an official statement of
Asgisa available, it first appeared as a back-
ground document at a press conference.
4. Vicki Robinson, 10 February 2006, "From
Gear to Asgi," Mail and Guardian Online,
w w w. m g . c o . z a / a r t i c l e P a g e . a s p x ?
articleid=263813&area=/budget_2006/
bud_insight/
5. It is easily overshadowed, for example, by the
massive expansions in State capital spending in
the 1950s and 1960s, the hey-days of import-
substitution-industrialisation by the National
Party.
6. Government of National Unity, 1996, Growth,
Employment and Redistribution: a macroeco-
nomic strategy, Republic of South Africa, pp. 16-
17.
_________________________________________
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