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(en) Canada, A&S*, Upping the Anti #1 - Anti-Globalization and "Diversity of Tactics" By Chris Hurl

From Worker <a-infos-en@ainfos.ca>
Date Tue, 26 Apr 2005 08:53:45 +0200 (CEST)

A - I N F O S N E W S S E R V I C E
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INTRODUCTION ---- The recent wave of protests that have swept across the world
under the banner of "anti-globalization" have recaptured the left's
imagination, shattering the illusions of inevitability cast by neo-liberal
magicians. The images and slogans from Seattle, Québec City, Prague,
and Genoa have become an important legacy, a fresh inspiration to
replace the fading images of Weathermen in football helmets. The
"new activism," as exemplified in the anti-globalization movement,
appears as a paradigm shift away from the politics of stale social
democratic parties and small Marxist-Leninist sects awaiting their
turn to play vanguard. In contrast to the homogenizing impulse of
global capitalism, resistance appears irreducibly plural.
While the anti-globalization movement is often celebrated for its
apparent diversity, it often remains unclear how this diversity manifests
itself in practice. The ambiguous boundaries of the movement serve to
obscure its specific social relationships. Insofar as "diversity" is treated
as a thing residing beyond specific social relationships, it is fetishized.
In the fragmented and episodic movement of "anti-globalization,"
diversity is often treated as universal, serving to supplant the
organization of specific social practices. I will explore how a "diversity
of tactics" emerged as a viable tactical orientation within this new
anti-capitalist movement and eventually turned against itself, when
the conditions for such diversity no longer existed.
The expression of this "diversity" in the anti-globalization
movement has been fundamentally tied to its strategic and tactical
orientation. Between the years of 1998 and 2001, hundreds of
thousands of people converged on high profile meetings of the ruling
elite to protest their neo-liberal program of "free trade" and structural
adjustment. Large militant actions exploded from city to city,
acronym to acronym, the G8 in Birmingham, the WTO in Seattle, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington DC, the FTAA
in Québec City. Through these actions activists have been able to tie
these acronyms together to expose an ideological program benefiting a
small minority. For a time this minority was left defensive, exasperated,
confused and, backpedaling. This was no small feat and the enormous
impression that these protests left on the world is undeniable.
While the "summit hopping" strategy was later criticized for
its undue focus on transient, large scale action at the expense of
grassroots local organizing, it was precisely for these reasons that the
anti-globalization protests were able to garner the attention that they
did. These protests brought together diffuse global networks of non-
governmental organizations, trade unions, religious groups and the
extra-parliamentary left. Through the compression of these networks
into the shared time and space of the event, the movement was able to
achieve a presence that no single group was able to achieve on its own.
Further, these events did much to invigorate an autonomous anti-
capitalist movement. With the convergence of significant numbers
of radical activists, large scale direct action could be organized and
coordinated. Connections were made and networks were formed that
still exist today.
The convergence of networks in these events has demanded a
great deal of coordination, organization and resources. It has required
the organization of a temporary infrastructure that is capable of
coordinating legal and medical support, food, housing, media, and other
aspects of mobilization. With organizing taking place on such a large
scale and encompassing so many transient groups and organizations,
no single group has been able to claim a monopoly in organizing. As
a February 2000 bulletin of People's Global Action put it, "There is
no centre anywhere that could hope to organize and oversee all this
mutual thickening of ties. It would be like trying to instruct a forest
how to grow."1 In this context, the expression of a "diversity of tactics"
did not just make sense, it was unavoidable.


In the midst of such diversity, the strategic organization and
coordination of action became a daunting task. How could the integrity
of action be maintained? The authority of any decision-making body
could not be taken for granted. In fact, there was the problem of
the elusive outside. There were those who were not included in the
decision-making process and, those who were participating in different
forms of protest.
Activists sought to ensure the coexistence of multiple strategic
and tactical standpoints through the segmentation of the space-time
of the event, For example, different "blocs" were exhibited in Prague,
different zones or territories of protest in Québec City and different
days of action in Genoa. And yet this segmentation has often not been
upheld. The segmentation of space is contingent upon the power of
groups to maintain boundaries. The struggle to occupy and transform
space has been an antagonistic process.
In fact, the debate around a diversity of tactics erupted in Seattle
due to the collapse of boundaries and guidelines for action. The Direct
Action Network brought together a number of West Coast activists
groups including Earth First!, the Rainforest Action Network, and
Art & Revolution, in an attempt to shut down the World Trade
Organization meeting through nonviolent direct action. In organizing
this action they adopted a standard set of nonviolent guidelines
including `no property destruction.' Some activists did not adhere to
these guidelines. The Black Bloc, a tactic enabling self-defense and
anonymity in militant action, was organized, and it targeted a series of
retail outlets, breaking windows and defacing corporate facades.
When faced with property destruction, many activists were quick
to dissociate themselves, with some going so far as to form a human
chain protecting Nike Town. On several occasions "nonviolent"
activists physically confronted activists engaging in property
destruction. They publicly condemned these actions and called for
the arrest of those involved. Medea Benjamin of Global Exchange
was notoriously quoted in the New York Times as saying, "Here we are
protecting Nike, McDonald's, the Gap and all the while I'm thinking,
`Where are the police? These anarchists should have been arrested."2
The organizational form adopted by the Direct Action Network was
unable to deal with groups that did not adhere to their guidelines.
There was no mechanism in place to deal with difference.
The Direct Action Network had largely adapted its organizational
form from the anti-nuclear movement of the 1970s and 1980s.3 During
those decades, large protests were organized in rural areas against
the construction of nuclear power plants. Broad regional coalitions
were formed such as the Clamshell Alliance in New England and the
Abalone Alliance in California to coordinate these actions. Decisions
were made in large assemblies or "spokescouncils" through a consensus
process. These assemblies were made up of delegates from various
affinity groups bringing together small groups of less than 20 people
who shared some kind of familiarity or association with each other.
In a relatively isolated rural context, this organizational model
achieved a degree of force and cohesion. A nonviolent position was
established and maintained through a variety of mechanisms. Grounded
in a specific region, these organizations were composed of a relatively
stable core community of activists. Discipline was largely maintained
through networks of affinity groups which formalized communication
between all those involved in action because "everyone knows if no
one knows you." Activists were required to participate in nonviolent
training and in some cases to sign agreements promising to refrain
from violence and property destruction. Activists who did not adhere
to nonviolent guidelines were socially ostracized and excluded. In
this context, a nonviolent purism developed. By 1986, Ward Churchill
wrote, "pacifism, the ideology of nonviolent political action, has
become axiomatic and all but universal among more progressive
elements of contemporary mainstream North America."4
Of course, this organizational model did not always work, even
then. Significant divisions developed as these organizations expanded.
In some cases, formal consensus could not be achieved and decision-
making moved to a voting model based on a 2/3 or 3/4 majority.
The organization of action outside the consensus process became
problematic. For instance, the Clamshell Alliance crumbled under
criticisms of an informal leadership who were unilaterally making
decisions outside of the consensus process. Further, the maintenance
of a nonviolent orthodoxy did not curtail the divergence of strategic
and tactical orientations. While some activists sought to halt the
construction of nuclear power plants through direct action, others
feared that this would alienate the rural communities and instead tried
to organize demonstrations.
The translation of this model by the Direct Action Network
to the organization of direct action in Seattle proved to be quite
successful. It enabled the coordination of decentralized groups
functioning relatively autonomously to effectively shut down the
WTO's first day of meetings. Groups were organized and networked
together on a series of levels, building from affinity groups to affiliated
clusters which were then distributed as wedges of a pie encircling the
conference centre. Decisions were made in a direct, decentralized and
timely fashion and were effectively communicated to other groups
enabling the adaptation of action to changing circumstances. With
the success of Seattle, this model was reinvigorated and widely applied
to actions all over the world.
However, the translation of this organizational model to large
scale urban protests was not without its problems. The lack of a clear
correspondence between organizations and the space of action made
the maintenance of broad parameters of action untenable. There was no
way to ensure that these parameters could be maintained. The Seattle
actions brought together a number of disparate groups in a temporary
convergence which could no longer be defined organizationally, but
led to the coexistence of multiple forms of organization in a shared
space and time. With the coexistence of multiple communities in this
extensive space, a nonviolent discipline could not be maintained. The
Seattle actions reflected the collapse of nonviolent dogma and opened
a space for the future "respect for a diversity of tactics."


In the wake of Seattle, debates around tactics often took on an
abstract tone. The question of what constitutes "violence" was posed,
and while dogmatic pacifists moralistically condemned property
destruction, others imbued it with a veneer of liberatory significance
of its own. As the ACME Collective argued in their communiqué on
the Seattle Black Bloc. "When we smash a window, we aim to destroy
the thin veneer of legitimacy that surrounds private property rights.
At the same time, we exercise that set of violent and destructive social
relationships which has been imbued in almost everything around
Insofar as these debates proceeded on a terrain of absolutes, the
discussions skirted the question of context. Those arguing for the
enforcement of nonviolent guidelines were faced with a context in
which nonviolent discipline could no longer be enforced and reacted
with condemnation and differentiation. "The revolution we are trying
to create didn't and doesn't need these parasites," argued one activist
in a Seattle Weekly article.6 On the other hand, property destruction
was often conflated with revolutionary anti-capitalism. It provided a
way to seemingly distinguish "reformist" from "revolutionary" tactics.
The strategic question of when and where property destruction could
be effectively utilized was often left unanswered.
In the emerging context, a rigid nonviolent position prohibiting
property destruction was widely recognized to be untenable. There
was a demand for more flexible ways of organizing and evaluating
action. Recognizing that their original hallmark calling for "nonviolent
civil disobedience" did not sufficiently take into account the distinct
connotations that this term would take in different parts of the world.
The PGA network clarified its position at Cochabamba in September
2001: "[T]here was always an understanding in PGA," it was argued,
"that nonviolence has to be understood as a guiding principle or ideal
which must always be understood relative to the particular political
and cultural situation." There was a concern that advocating a strictly
"nonviolent" perspective could potentially marginalize and criminalize
a whole segment of activists and deny the history of people's struggles
in many parts of the world. As a result, the language shifted from
"nonviolent civil disobedience" to a call for "forms of resistance which
maximize respect for life and oppressed peoples' rights."7
With the coexistence of multiple groups pursuing their own
actions in a shared space, there was a demand to regiment action
in a more flexible way. No single group could set such guidelines for
action. Thus, a limit was placed on the organizational form. If a group
could not enforce parameters for action, then how did groups handle
disagreements over tactics? In reflecting on the Seattle protests
Michael Albert argued:
I think that what modestly (as compared to "seriously")
impaired the movement's ability to get on with growing
and struggling was a very real division over tactics and that
that division in this case was handled poorly largely due
to a lack of mechanisms for dealing with disagreement. I
think a priority task ought to be to develop and agree on
such mechanisms, so that we don't suffer such problems
again in the future, or even see them get worse.
The call to respect a "diversity of tactics" reflected the
inauguration of a more flexible regimentation of action, allowing for
disagreements over tactics without falling into public condemnation
or criminalization. Such condemnation was seen by many as divisive,
contributing to the distinctions drawn in the corporate media between
"good" and "bad" protesters. The call to "respect a diversity of tactics"
was first and foremost a call for solidarity, respectfully disagreeing
with other activists rather than demanding their arrest.
The events in Seattle presented a model for action that was
widely adopted by activists in North America and Europe. Everywhere
activists tried to organize the "next Seattle." For radicals this meant
disrupting the meetings of world leaders wherever they went. Black
Blocs became a more common sight in protests. Trade union leaders
continued to steer their marches away from any sign of confrontation
and into empty parking lots, while non-governmental organizations
organized counter-summits parallel to the meetings of the ruling class,
eventually culminating in the World Social Forum at Porto Alegre in
September 2001. The drive to maintain momentum demanded that
everyone put aside their differences and just keep on doing what they
were doing. At times this culminated in the uncritical valorization of
differences, the liberal misconception that our actions will be most
effective if everyone does their own thing.
With the diffusion of this model across North America, a "respect
for a diversity of tactics" was widely adopted by activists. The call for
a "diversity of tactics" reverberated in a series of local militant actions.
And yet the translation of this model to other contexts was often ill-
suited, but nevertheless taken for granted. While the shutdown in
Seattle was accomplished through a well coordinated strategy with
a little help from unsuspecting authorities, the implementation of
this model in other contexts was anticipated by both activists and
authorities. While this contributed to widespread participation in
militant direct action, it also contributed to its containment.


The next major action following Seattle was organized for April 16,
2000 (A16) against the IMF and World Bank meetings in Washington
DC. Largely emulating the organizational form of the Direct Action
Network, a broad coalition of activists came together under the name
Mobilization for Global Justice (Mob4glob) to organize for this event.
The group continued to utilize a consensus model in which decisions
would be made by affinity groups coordinated through spokescouncil
assemblies. Mob4glob also attempted to set guidelines for action
reinforcing a commitment to nonviolence and specifically `no property
destruction.' In response to such guidelines, a number of anarchist
and libertarian socialist groups issued a call for a Revolutionary Anti-
Capitalist Bloc.
We believe that the most effective protest is each group
autonomously taking action and using tactics that they
feel work best for their situation. We do not advocate one
particular tactic but believe that the greatest diversity of
tactics is the most effective use of tactics. We are critical
of ideologically motivated arguments that oppose this.
This is why we do not believe that it is organizationally
principled for any one group to set the guidelines for the
protests or claim ownership of the movement.9

This call for a "diversity of tactics" was part of a broader push for
the autonomous organization of revolutionary anti-capitalists in North
America. It put to rest the pretension that any single group could set
parameters for action, while at the same time declaring the presence
of a distinctly "anti-capitalist" formation that would exist outside
these parameters. On the one hand the "bloc" appeared as a hub for
militant direct action, on the other hand it espoused the idea that the
"greatest diversity of tactics is the most effective use of tactics." On
this basis, the presence of diversity was considered effective in itself.
The strategic focus of the revolutionary anti-capitalists remained
It should not be presumed that the push for an autonomous anti-
capitalist bloc entailed a split from Mob4glob and other progressive
groups. Throughout these protests there had been considerable
cooperation and crossover between revolutionary anti-capitalists
and left liberals in the institutional left. In Seattle, the contribution
of financial and administrative resources by non-governmental
organizations, not to mention the breakaway by thousands of trade
unionists from the official labour march contributed to the successful
shutdown of the meetings. In organizing for the A16 actions in
Washington DC many activists participated in both the Revolutionary
Anti-Capitalist Bloc and Mob4glob. While Mob4glob did not openly
condone property destruction, there was a degree of solidarity and tacit
support for the pursuit of more militant actions through autonomous
anti-capitalist organization. At a press conference leading up to the
action Mob4glob organizer Nadine Bloch asserted:
We want to focus on the issues of structural violence
against people by the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization,
rather than get mired down in discussions about tactics,
because we know that everybody who's going to be out on
the street is going to be there because they're motivated
by the same great feeling of anger and frustration about
the ability to set their future direction in this world and
stand up for environmental rights and human dignity.10
This reflected a relatively common position. There was a desire
not to get bogged down in divisive arguments over tactics in order to
keep up the momentum of the movement.
A16 showed that Seattle was not just a glitch. Nearly 40,000
people from a wide range of backgrounds came together in protest.
Government offices were closed and bureaucrats were told not to
go to work. Within this action a visible and widely supported anti-
capitalist movement solidified. Anti-capitalists played an important
role in organizing militant action, self-defense and jail solidarity. Yet
the effectiveness of more militant tactics in DC remained limited.
Anticipating the attempted shutdown of the meeting, delegates
to the IMF and World Bank meetings were brought in early. When
the activists' plans to block intersections were thwarted, it became
unclear how to proceed. Some activists decided to join the large mass
demonstration while others attempted to maintain a lockdown on
various intersections. With a lack of a strategic focus or coordinated
plan of action, activists marched aimlessly around the city, occasionally
knocking over newspaper boxes.
Building to the Québec City protests against the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), the anti-capitalist movement
gained widespread support and acceptance amongst activists. In
many circles, "anti-capitalism" even supplanted that ugly term "anti-
globalization" in describing the movement. Yet the fortunes of the
anti-capitalist movement remained closely tied to the successful
translation of "diversity of tactics" within a regime for action derived
at a specific moment, in a specific context. Since Seattle, the debate
around a "diversity of tactics" had emerged in many different contexts
and was translated into many different actions.
In Montreal, the rift manifested itself most clearly in "Operation
SalAMI," a coalition of activists who came together in opposition
to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).11 SalAMI was
organized as a nonhierarchical collective based on the principles of
training, transparency, and nonviolent action. This group would surface
in May 1998 in its blockade of an MAI meeting in Montreal. However,
many activists would leave the group frustrated with SalAMI's informal
and unaccountable leadership and its dogmatic nonviolent position.12
Many of these activists would come together again in the
Convergence des Luttes Anti-Capitaliste (CLAC) to organize actions
against the FTAA meeting in Québec City in April 2001. CLAC
brought together a broad network of activists committed to anti-
capitalism and organized through assemblies bringing together a
network of affinity groups. They adopted a basis for unity that included
a "respect for a diversity of tactics" ranging from "popular education
to direct action."
In contrast to A16, where the revolutionary anti-capitalist bloc
was tied together in militant direct action and protest, the basis for
unity adopted by CLAC provided a space where anti-capitalists could
meet beyond such actions. It was an anti-capitalist stance rather
than any specific mode of action that tied CLAC together. This gave
CLAC more staying power as compared with the temporary "bloc"
organizations at A16. In fact, CLAC continues to participate in anti-
capitalist organizing in Montreal today.
Nevertheless, the centrality of anti-capitalism in Québec City
remained tied to specific circumstances of action. Here, the regime
for action that had been developing since Seattle would work well.
In order to ensure that people could decide on their own level of
involvement in protests, there were attempts to segment space into
different protest zones. However, these zones quickly broke down
as confrontations intensified. A shared hatred of the fence encircling
the conference centre and a large portion of the city drove thousands
of activists to wade into the tear-gas-saturated streets in attempts
to disrupt the meetings. Activists were united in facing this looming
These militant actions gained widespread support from the
more liberal elements of the movement, not to mention the local
population. Notably, Maude Barlow from the Council of Canadians,
who had previously condemned the use of more militant tactics,13
acknowledged a space for these tactics in her speech in Québec City.
Rather than calling for the arrest of more militant demonstrators
as she did in Seattle, Barlow acknowledged that it was not for her
to try to control or regulate protesters. "There was some vandalism
yesterday, yes," she argued, "but where was the first vandalism? The
first vandalism was in that scar of a wall they put up in our beautiful
city. That wall was the first vandalism."14


By the time of the G8 meeting in Kananaskis took place, the
context for organizing had changed significantly. Even prior to 9/11,
activists in the global North faced intensifying repression. In June
2001, protests against the European Union summit in Gothenburg,
Sweden were met with live ammunition and in July, Carlos Guiliani was
murdered while protesting the G8 in Genoa. Police directly targeted
the more liberal elements with police violence while at the same time
infiltrating more militant groups using agents-provocateurs in attempts
to fragment the movement. However, keeping protests under wraps
became less of a concern as the ruling class began meeting in remote
locations such as Qatar and Kananaskis.
The events of 9/11 took the wind out of the sails of the anti-
globalization movement. Prior to 9/11, the call to respect for a
"diversity of tactics" had tied together a wide range of activists in a
broad movement against capitalism. But in an emerging context of
police repression and patriotism, the call to respect a "diversity of
tactics" rang hollow. With the looming threat of terrorism, legislation
was passed in the Canadian state and the United States granting the
police and security agencies extensive powers. The line between direct
action and terrorism became increasingly and intentionally blurred,
and many groups backed away from mass mobilizations altogether. The
next large scale mobilizations, scheduled to take place in Washington
DC at the end of September against the IMF and World Bank, were
The mountain fortress of Kananaskis, surrounded by an
interminable series of security checkpoints, provided a daunting task
for those seeking to disrupt the meeting. The surrounding area was
sparsely populated and extremely conservative. In Alberta, activists
could expect little support from the locals. In fact, the city of Calgary,
where action would be organized, denied even requests for space in
the city parks. Moreover, civil liberties were being rampantly curtailed
under the pretense of a looming terrorist threat. Snipers were given
orders to shoot on sight.
In this context, the model for action derived from Seattle no
longer proved to be effective. As Starhawk argued,
The recent protests in Alberta against the G8, the heads
of the eight most industrialized countries, are an example
of what happens when we apply organizing models that
don't actually fit the situation we're in. When we cook
for a hotter fire than we actually have, we end up with
porridge that is colder than it needs to be.15
In organizing for this action, Alberta activists came together in
an "Anti-Capitalist Caucus" calling for a "respect for a diversity of
tactics." Yet what "anti-capitalism" or "diversity of tactics" meant
in this context remained unclear. Unable to effectively disrupt the
G8 meetings, activists instead attempted to organize a snake march
aiming at economic disruption in downtown Calgary.
In Kananaskis, the call for a "diversity of tactics" was detached
from a context where it could serve as a coherent strategy. While in
Québec City, the callout for a "diversity of tactics" entailed a clear
strategic target for militant direct action, in Calgary there was no
clear connection between direct action and an articulated strategic
aim. The push to direct action imploded in a series of spectacles aimed
to shock. "Disruption" was fetishized, serving as a means of personal
catharsis that was deemed effective in and for itself. Some activists
chose to strip naked in front of The Gap. Others organized a game
of "anarchist soccer" in the streets. While the expression of militant
direct action in other contexts was able to draw support from other
activists, the local population, and the general public, in this case the
fetishization of "disruption" served to marginalize activists from the
communities that they were trying to reach.
The call for a "diversity of tactics" was interjected at a vital
moment, breaking a liberal hegemony and helping to build a nascent
revolutionary anti-capitalist movement in North America. It provided
a means of contesting nonviolent dogma and entrenched a new
repertoire for action that included more confrontational tactics. It
enabled the establishment of a extensive solidarity between groups
rather than an intensive solidarity within groups predicated on the
fetishization of nonviolence. Yet this way of organizing action was
fundamentally tied to the particular context of its emergence. The call
for a diversity of tactics emerged through the organization of militant
direct action in large urban centers seeking to disrupt the meetings of
the ruling class. In the absence of such a context the call for a diversity
of tactics often becomes fetishized.
While there has been a great deal of emphasis on the presence of
"diversity" in the recent wave of protests, the manner in which this
"diversity" has concretely coalesced in action is often forgotten. In
fact, the presence of an autonomous "anti-capitalist movement" in
North America has largely been restricted to spectacular mass actions.
As the summit hopping strategy has become less tenable, activists
have focused on organizing in their own cities. Yet the presence of
anti-capitalism as a strong autonomous movement in many local
communities remains limited. While anti-capitalists are certainly active
in a whole host of other activities, we remain fragmented precisely
insofar as we are organized in decentralized networks without any
points of convergence and insofar as we have not drawn continuities
beyond these large-scale mass actions. We remain fragmented insofar
as we are unified by militant direct action rather than coherent theory
and analysis. As such, our actions are often subordinated under a liberal
"progressive" hegemony. The task for revolutionary anti-capitalists
today is to develop new forms of convergence that move beyond
ephemeral actions and the rhetoric of "diversity."
Chris Hurl is a student and activist living in Victoria. He is currently
completing a Masters degree in Sociology and Social Theory focusing on the
anti-globalization movement.


1 "PGA Bulletin #5" (UK Edition). (February 2000).
2 "Talks and Turmoil: The Violence; Black Masks lead to pointed fingers in
Seattle," In New York Times, (A,1; December 2, 1999).
3 Epstein, B. (1991). Political Protest and Cultural Revolution. Berkeley: University
of California Press.
Midnight Notes Collective. (1979). "Strange Victories," http://www.geocities.com/cordobakaf/vict.html
4 Churchill, W. (1998). Pacifism as Pathology. Winnipeg: Artbeiter Ring, 29.
5 Acme Collective. (December 4, 1999). "N30 Black Bloc Communique."
6 Parrish, G. (Dec. 9-15, 1999). "Anarchists, go home!" In Seattle Weekly
7 Hallmarks of Peoples' Global Action, changed at the 3rd PGA Conference in
Cochabamba http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/pga/hallm.htm
8 Albert, M. (1999). "Response to Katsiaficas." http://www.zmag.org/replytokats.htm
9 "A16 Revolutionary Anti-Capitalist Bloc Statement." (2000).
10 http://www.sinkers.org/a16/kickoff/
11 "SalAMI" is a play on words meaning "dirty friend" or "dirty MAI" in French.
12 Conway, J. (2003). "Civil Resistance and the `Diversity of Tactics' in Anti-
Globalization Movement: Problems of Violence, Silence, and Solidarity in Activist
Politics," In Osgoode Hall Law Journal (2/3), 519. http://www.yorku.ca/ohlj/english/
13 Reflecting on the Seattle protests, Barlow and Clarke argued, "To the distress
of local residents and peaceful demonstrators, the police did not arrest these people,
but they used the media's property-damage images to justify their brutal crackdown
against the peaceful majority" (Barlow & Clarke, 2001, 13).
14 Reprinted in The Nation, May 28, 2001,
15 http://www.starhawk.org/activism/activism-writings/tacticsright.html
* A&S - Autonomy & Solidarity is an anticapitalist antiauthoritarian
revolutionary network in Canada.]

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